fix(scripts): e2e-anvil EXIT trap and MockReserveCl8y extraction (#279) #409
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Delete branch "cursor/e2e-anvil-trap-cl8y-279-222d"
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Summary
Fixes GitLab #279.
_yieldomega_kill_pid_if_set)MockReserveCl8y:log + broadcast fallbackKEY_EVM_*in e2e-anvilscripts-smokeCloses #279
Security review (automation)
Commit reviewed:
7f2cce93839962de73d36858cbb1a1ca26c21e05Scope: Anvil E2E / dev-deploy script reliability (#279) —
scripts/e2e-anvil.sh,scripts/lib/anvil_deploy_dev.sh,DeployDev.s.sollog alignment, broadcast JSON fallback for MockReserveCl8y extraction, hermetic regressions, andunset KEY_EVM_*in e2e-anvil.Method: Diff-only review; traced env/file inputs through grep/jq/python extractors, seed minter PK resolution, and EXIT-trap cleanup. Checked for injection, secret leakage, authz bypass, and unsafe deserialization on attacker-controlled paths.
Outcome:
FINDINGS: 0medium+Summary: No exploitable medium-or-higher issues on this diff. Changes are confined to local Anvil / CI dev tooling (loopback RPC + chain-id guards in seed script unchanged). Labels passed to
_yieldomega_extract_addr_from_logare hardcoded contract names, not external input. Broadcast fallback reads a fixed relative path underROOT, validates0x+40-hex addresses, and does not eval JSON contents. Unsetting CloudKEY_EVM_*overrides before deploy reduces risk of seeding non-Anvil keys during E2E. EXIT trap guard prevents accidentalkill 0process-group signaling.Inline threads: none (no medium+ findings).
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