docs: note pause freezes limit-order escrow with no force-refund path (#457) #986
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code/cl8y-dex-terraclassic!986
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Delete branch "qa/457-pause-escrow-docs"
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Pausing a pair also blocks CancelLimitOrder(s) and ClaimExpiredLimitOrder(s), so
users with resting or expiry-parked limit orders cannot retrieve their escrowed
funds for the duration of the pause — and governance has no force-refund path
(SweepPair only moves excess balance, not a depositor's locked order). The
emergency-commands "Pause a pair" section listed the blocked operations but
didn't surface this user-protection consequence for an operator pausing under
time pressure (SEC-I03 F-03).
Add a note callout: keep pauses short, state in incident comms that open limit
orders are locked (funds safe but not withdrawable), and the pointer that a
governance-callable emergency force-refund would be a separate implementation
issue if the team wants one.
Docs-only; check_emergency_commands_docs.py passes.
assigned to @Brouie
mentioned in issue #457
Security review — MR !986
Commit reviewed:
62209b1ff21d3d8790050e6bf6f4d9a328b5e0f8Scope: Docs-only diff — adds a user-escrow consequence callout to
docs/runbooks/emergency-commands.md(pause blocksCancelLimitOrder(s)/ClaimExpiredLimitOrder(s); no governance force-refund path; operational guidance for incident comms).Method: Inspected full MR diff; traced documented claims against existing on-chain pause gates (invariant L6) and contract tests (
claim_expired_limit_order_blocked_while_pair_paused_then_succeeds_after_unpause,batch_cancel_while_paused_reverts). No executable code, config, dependency, or secret-handling changes in this diff.Outcome:
FINDINGS: 0medium+Details: The MR documents pre-existing pause semantics for operators; it does not introduce new attack surface, auth bypass, injection sinks, SSRF/XSS vectors, or credential exposure. Markdown links are static GitLab/issue URLs. No inline security threads opened.
Security review: no medium+ findings on this diff.
mentioned in commit
a1d92b622a