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code/cl8y-dex-terraclassic!757
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Delete branch "qa/295-298-limit-ladder-ux"
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Four fixes in the limit-ladder panel (one component, bundled to avoid same-file conflicts):
btn-neo; switched to the primary CTA class (btn-primary btn-cta) the other order-submit buttons use.describeLimitCrossingBlockerper rung) — disables submit, warns inline, and hard-guards in the mutation when ladder rungs cross the market.tsc -b clean. Frontend-only; browser/visual verification is totdking's. No closing keyword.
mentioned in issue #295
mentioned in issue #296
mentioned in issue #297
mentioned in issue #298
Security review (automated)
Commit reviewed:
84dae10f326e4d714affe4637355d4143669121fScope:
frontend-dapp/src/components/trade/LimitOrderLadderPanel.tsxonly (MR diff: rung-count draft input + clamp-on-blur, primary CTA styling, non-crossing guard ported from single-order flow, React Query cache invalidation for limit book / best book).Method: Traced user-controlled inputs (
rungCountInput, ladder prices, indexerbestBid/bestAsk) to UI sinks andplaceMutation; compared crossing-guard pattern toTradeOrderTicket.tsx; confirmed on-chain enforcement remains authoritative for batch size and order insertion.Outcome: FINDINGS: 0 (no medium, high, or critical issues on this diff)
Inline threads: None — no findings to anchor.
Summary
This MR is client-side UX and safety hardening. No new auth surfaces, secrets, server endpoints, or dependency changes.
LimitOrderEscrowPlaceGuardMessage, error<p>); nodangerouslySetInnerHTML. Crossing messages reuse existingdescribeLimitCrossingBlocker(already used inTradeOrderTicket).placeLimitOrder*WithAllowancehelpers.bestBid/bestAskare absent — pre-existing indexer semantics, user-economic impact only.rungCountused for preview/submit stays bounded bymax_batch_rungson valid input and clamp-on-blur; contract enforces limits on-chain. Transient input/display desync is UX-only, not a privilege boundary.invalidateQueriesfor book keys — consistency fix only, no new data exposure.Security review: no medium+ findings on this diff.
mentioned in commit
6e42a5b6f6mentioned in merge request !767
mentioned in issue #385
mentioned in merge request !914