Security hardening checklist for small-TVL launch #381

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opened 2026-06-14 12:03:17 +00:00 by PlasticDigits · 139 comments
PlasticDigits commented 2026-06-14 12:03:17 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

Context and Target Posture

Assumptions: projected launch is < $100k TVL and < 100 users. Security should focus on high-value, low-complexity defenses that reduce obvious loss, improve incident communication, and make historical exploit replay harder. We should assume attackers will use LLM agents and historical hack data to generate tests, prompts, fuzz cases, and exploit scripts against this repo.

Non-goal: defending against highly resourced/sophisticated attackers with bespoke zero-days. Goal: avoid preventable loss, user confusion, admin-key mistakes, known CosmWasm/Cosmos-stack exploit classes, and weak incident response.

Relevant historical themes to model: Terra/Astroport IBC-hooks reentrancy/infinite-mint exposure, Osmosis pool-share accounting bug, Levana oracle/update-timing manipulation, malicious token/contract registration, admin-key compromise, frontend wallet/signing confusion, indexer/API amplification, SQL/query injection, event spoofing, stale deployment/runbook drift.

Definition of Done

Each checked item must include evidence in an MR, issue comment, test output, runbook link, or explicit risk acceptance. Prefer automated tests where feasible; use manual runbook verification only when automation has poor ROI for the current TVL/user count.

SEC-A: Risk Scope and User Communication

  • SEC-A01 Define the public security posture for small-TVL launch: capped expectations, unaudited/limited-audit language, admin controls, and known residual risks. Verify: docs page or launch notice exists and is linked from the dApp/footer.
  • SEC-A02 Write user-facing copy for trading blacklist, pair pause, wrap pause, rate limit, indexer outage, and excessive slippage states. Verify: frontend tests assert clear messages and disabled CTAs where applicable.
  • SEC-A03 Add a “what happens during an incident” explanation: pause/blacklist/rate-limit actions, expected user impact, and how funds/LP positions are handled. Verify: runbook or FAQ reviewed by developer and linked from security docs.
  • SEC-A04 Document that factory trading blacklist is different from fee-discount tier 255. Verify: docs mention tier 255 does not halt trading and tests cover actual blacklist behavior.
  • SEC-A05 Document user recovery paths after unpause/unblacklist, including LP withdraw, limit cancel/claim, and swap retry. Verify: LocalTerra or cw-multi-test evidence shows recovery after control removal.
  • SEC-A06 Add launch decision language: when to pause launch, when to launch with accepted risk, and when to block launch. Verify: checklist includes explicit go/no-go section signed off before production deploy.
  • SEC-A07 Create a concise security contact/escalation path for users reporting suspicious trades or UI states. Verify: visible docs issue/MR with contact path and expected response window.

SEC-B: Admin Controls, Governance, and Emergency Authority

  • SEC-B01 Verify governance-only access for blacklist wallet/token/pair operations. Verify: contract tests fail for non-governance callers and pass for governance.
  • SEC-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution.
  • SEC-B03 Verify token blacklist blocks both directions for every pair containing the token. Verify: tests cover offer-token and ask-token directions.
  • SEC-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair.
  • SEC-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy.
  • SEC-B06 Verify wrap mapper pause blocks wrapping/unwrapping and produces clear UI copy. Verify: frontend unit tests and LocalTerra smoke test.
  • SEC-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update.
  • SEC-B08 Verify LP admin rotation is bounded/paginated and cannot fan out unbounded during UpdateConfig. Verify: existing #277 invariant tests plus docs/runbook step.
  • SEC-B09 Verify emergency controls are executable from the actual planned governance wallet/multisig, not just local test keys. Verify: testnet/local dry run using same signing flow or documented manual rehearsal.
  • SEC-B10 Document admin-key custody for small launch: multisig preferred, named backup signer, no single hot wallet for mainnet if avoidable. Verify: deployment runbook has signer list and rotation process.
  • SEC-B11 Add an emergency “pause/blacklist/unpause/unblacklist” command cookbook. Verify: commands are copy-pastable, parameterized, and rehearsed on LocalTerra.
  • SEC-B12 Add explicit criteria for blacklisting during incidents: confirmed exploit signer, malicious token, compromised pair, and false-positive rollback. Verify: incident runbook has decision tree and rollback step.

SEC-C: Smart Contract Value-Flow Invariants

  • SEC-C01 Verify constant-product swap accounting cannot return more value than reserves permit after fee/spread. Verify: unit/property tests for swap math, including edge reserves and tiny amounts.
  • SEC-C02 Verify provide/withdraw liquidity share accounting cannot mint excess LP shares like the Osmosis pool-share exploit class. Verify: tests cover add/remove round trips, asymmetric deposits, initial liquidity, and repeated exploit-style cycles.
  • SEC-C03 Verify commission/treasury transfer is atomic and pair does not retain fees unexpectedly. Verify: contract tests compare balances before/after successful and reverted swaps.
  • SEC-C04 Verify max_spread, min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants.
  • SEC-C05 Verify native-token rejection remains enforced until native/wrap support is intentionally enabled. Verify: contract tests reject AssetInfo::NativeToken where documented.
  • SEC-C06 Verify CW20 code ID whitelist blocks malicious/unapproved token contracts from pair creation. Verify: create-pair tests include unwhitelisted CW20 and approved CW20.
  • SEC-C07 Verify pair-creation fee and one-create-per-block gate reduce spam/griefing and are documented. Verify: tests cover no fee, wrong denom, overpay refund, same-block second create, and governance fee update.
  • SEC-C08 Verify hooks are governance-only, bounded/trusted, and hook revert behavior is intentional. Verify: tests cover non-governance hook registration rejection and hook revert causing swap failure.
  • SEC-C09 Verify router trusted-trader field cannot steal another wallet’s fee discount. Verify: tests cover untrusted router trader spoofing and trusted router success.
  • SEC-C10 Verify fee-discount EOA-only self-registration and governance-only Tier 0 / Tier 255 behavior. Verify: tests cover contract self-registration rejection and governance registration.
  • SEC-C11 Verify lazy deregistration on insufficient CL8Y balance never grants stale discount for the current swap. Verify: tests assert discount bps is zero once balance falls below tier.
  • SEC-C12 Verify limit order escrow cannot be stolen or stranded by fill/cancel/claim paths. Verify: tests cover partial fill, full fill, cancel, expiry park, claim refund, and pause/blacklist interactions.
  • SEC-C13 Verify hybrid swap consumes bounded maker fills and cannot exceed configured scan/fill budgets. Verify: tests cover max maker fills, expired head orders, and skipped overflow behavior.
  • SEC-C14 Verify contract migrations preserve all critical storage invariants: governance, treasury, pair registry, LP admin, blacklist, discounts, and limit books. Verify: migration tests from deployed versions to current version.
  • SEC-C15 Verify no unbounded iteration is reachable by public users on hot paths. Verify: gas-focused tests or code review notes for factory, pair, router, and limit book paths.

SEC-D: Historical Cosmos/CosmWasm Exploit Replay Matrix

  • SEC-D01 Create a historical exploit matrix with date, protocol, root cause, affected component, our equivalent surface, mitigation, and verification. Verify: committed docs table with links to tests/issues.
  • SEC-D02 Model Terra/Astroport IBC-hooks reentrancy/infinite-mint as a threat to bridged/CW20 assets and chain dependency patching. Verify: deployment runbook checks chain version/IBC-hooks exposure and records whether app contracts directly use IBC hooks.
  • SEC-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable.
  • SEC-D04 Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. Verify: exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance.
  • SEC-D05 Model Levana oracle/update-timing manipulation as route/quote/stale-price risk even if not using external oracle for settlement. Verify: route/slippage tests and docs clarify quotes are advisory until on-chain execution.
  • SEC-D06 Model malicious CW20 token behavior: transfer failure, fee-on-transfer, rebase-like balance changes, callback griefing. Verify: tests or documented risk acceptance for whitelist-only token admission.
  • SEC-D07 Model fake pair/fake event emission against the indexer. Verify: tests prove _contract_address scoping and factory provenance reject clone/fake pair events.
  • SEC-D08 Model SQL/query injection against public API sort, interval, ticker, pair, and CSV/export routes. Verify: indexer security tests cover malicious strings and return 400/404 without raw SQL errors.
  • SEC-D09 Model LCD amplification by LLM agents crawling orderbooks/routes. Verify: rate-limit tests, LCD query-budget tests, and cache tests on heavy routes.
  • SEC-D10 Model admin-key compromise as the most realistic high-impact attack for small TVL. Verify: governance custody/runbook review and emergency rotation rehearsal.
  • SEC-D11 Model frontend wallet phishing/signing confusion. Verify: wallet signing UI clearly names action, pair, amount, max spread/min return, and chain; tests assert dangerous action labels.
  • SEC-D12 Model stale deployment artifact or missed security patch like Terra’s missed IBC patch. Verify: deploy runbook records git SHA, contract code IDs, chain versions, and post-deploy verification commands.

SEC-E: Frontend, Wallet, and User-Safety UX

  • SEC-E01 Verify dApp disables swap/provide/withdraw/limit actions when blacklist check blocks wallet/token/pair. Verify: frontend tests across Swap, Pool, Trade, Limits/Portfolio paths.
  • SEC-E02 Verify pair pause banner is visible and action-specific copy is clear. Verify: frontend tests assert banner and disabled actions.
  • SEC-E03 Verify wrap pause state disables wrapping with clear copy. Verify: frontend unit test plus LocalTerra smoke test.
  • SEC-E04 Verify rate-limit responses show calm retry guidance, not generic broken-app errors. Verify: frontend tests mock 429 and assert displayed message.
  • SEC-E05 Verify indexer outage and LCD 502 states distinguish “data unavailable” from “funds at risk.” Verify: tests for API error mapping and visible copy.
  • SEC-E06 Verify extreme slippage blocks retail submit unless Expert Mode is explicitly enabled. Verify: tests for >30% and ≥99% slippage behavior.
  • SEC-E07 Verify route display aligns with actual submit operations and does not show duplicate/conflicting routes. Verify: route display tests and LocalTerra swap trace.
  • SEC-E08 Verify wallet signing fee guard prevents known Terra Station/LocalTerra stale-fee confusion where applicable. Verify: existing fee guard tests and manual wallet QA notes.
  • SEC-E09 Verify risk acknowledgement modal/copy is shown for launch-risk areas without becoming click-through noise. Verify: UX review and tests for persistence/reset behavior.
  • SEC-E10 Verify external links/explorer links are sanitized and cannot inject script or misleading URLs. Verify: unit tests for explorer URL builder and link rendering.

SEC-F: Indexer, API, and Data Integrity

  • SEC-F01 Verify production API rate limits are nonzero by default and cannot be disabled accidentally under RUN_MODE=prod. Verify: indexer tests and startup log check.
  • SEC-F02 Verify LCD-heavy routes have stricter limits than ordinary read routes. Verify: tests show heavy-route 429 under configured threshold.
  • SEC-F03 Verify API uses socket peer IP only unless a trusted proxy design is implemented. Verify: tests/config docs reject spoofable forwarded-header extraction.
  • SEC-F04 Verify IPv4-only default or documented IPv6 anti-abuse strategy. Verify: config tests and deployment runbook mention API_IPV6_ENABLED.
  • SEC-F05 Verify query caps lower-bound and upper-bound every list/depth/limit route. Verify: integration tests cover negative, zero, huge, and valid values.
  • SEC-F06 Verify internal DB/LCD errors are sanitized and do not leak SQL, URLs, stack traces, or secrets. Verify: security tests assert generic 500/502 bodies.
  • SEC-F07 Verify CORS allowlist is explicit for production and dev. Verify: tests for allowed/disallowed origins and deploy env review.
  • SEC-F08 Verify block ingest fails safe on bad timestamps, pagination gaps, DB errors, and reorg hash mismatch. Verify: indexer ingestion hardening tests and reorg runbook.
  • SEC-F09 Verify swap/fill/lifecycle dedup prevents replay/double counting. Verify: unique indexes plus replay tests.
  • SEC-F10 Verify hybrid volume reconciliation cannot double-count maker fills as headline volume. Verify: indexer tests for pool/book leg sums and API aggregate totals.
  • SEC-F11 Verify factory pair provenance prevents fake pair indexing. Verify: malicious clone tests and production FACTORY_ADDRESS required.
  • SEC-F12 Verify CSV export cannot produce formula injection surprises for common spreadsheet clients. Verify: review/export tests or documented risk acceptance if all exported fields are controlled numeric/address/hash values.
  • SEC-F13 Verify logs avoid private keys, mnemonics, bearer tokens, database URLs, and raw user secrets. Verify: grep/static review and test fixtures where feasible.

SEC-G: Monitoring, Detection, and Incident Response

  • SEC-G01 Define minimum launch monitoring: contract error spikes, indexer lag, API 429/5xx, large swaps, large LP withdraws, blacklist hits, pause state changes. Verify: runbook lists commands/dashboards/log queries.
  • SEC-G02 Add a simple anomaly checklist for small TVL: single wallet drains >X% pool, repeated add/remove profit loops, sudden route slippage, many failed txs, LCD-heavy route flood. Verify: incident runbook includes thresholds and response actions.
  • SEC-G03 Verify admin can identify top pools by TVL/liquidity quickly during incident. Verify: command/query in runbook returns pairs sorted by approximate value or quote liquidity.
  • SEC-G04 Verify admin can identify suspicious wallet/pair/token quickly. Verify: indexer/API queries or SQL snippets in runbook.
  • SEC-G05 Verify emergency communications template exists for pause, blacklist, exploit investigation, false alarm, and postmortem. Verify: docs include templates ready to paste.
  • SEC-G06 Verify incident timeline template captures time, tx hash, wallet, token, pair, admin action, and user impact. Verify: runbook includes blank template.
  • SEC-G07 Verify restore procedure requires root cause or explicit risk acceptance before unpause/unblacklist. Verify: runbook has restore checklist.
  • SEC-G08 Verify no reliance on chain halt as the primary dApp incident control. Verify: runbook prioritizes app-level pause/blacklist/rate-limit before external validator coordination.

SEC-H: Deployment and Release Runbooks

  • SEC-H01 Write production deploy runbook with prerequisites, git SHA, contract artifacts, code IDs, addresses, governance/treasury, env vars, and rollback notes. Verify: runbook can be followed by another developer on LocalTerra/testnet.
  • SEC-H02 Verify LocalTerra deploy exercises real pair-creation fee and admin controls. Verify: deploy transcript or automated check references created pair, fee, pause, blacklist, unpause.
  • SEC-H03 Verify post-deploy contract queries match expected config: governance, treasury, default fee, whitelisted CW20 code IDs, trusted routers, hooks, blacklist empty/default. Verify: scripted query output attached to release issue.
  • SEC-H04 Verify frontend .env and indexer .env addresses match deployed contracts exactly. Verify: post-deploy script compares env files against chain query output.
  • SEC-H05 Verify migrations are rehearsed from previous deployed code IDs and rollback limitations are documented. Verify: migration test output and runbook note.
  • SEC-H06 Verify secrets are not committed and CI/CD variables are scoped. Verify: secret scan/grep and GitLab variable review.
  • SEC-H07 Verify dependency audit is proportionate: cargo audit/Rust review where practical, npm audit triage for high/critical runtime deps, no broad yak-shave for dev-only noise. Verify: audit output or risk-accepted notes.
  • SEC-H08 Verify release checklist requires tests before deploy: contracts, indexer lib/integration as applicable, frontend unit tests, and at least one LocalTerra swap/limit smoke. Verify: release issue has pasted commands and results.
  • SEC-H09 Verify rollback/forward-fix decision tree for frontend-only issue, indexer issue, contract issue, and chain dependency issue. Verify: runbook section reviewed.

SEC-I: LLM-Agent Adversary Testing

  • SEC-I01 Build an “LLM attacker prompt pack” from historical incidents and ask agents to generate exploit hypotheses against this repo. Verify: saved prompts/results and triaged findings.
  • SEC-I02 Convert plausible LLM-generated exploit hypotheses into regression tests or explicit risk acceptances. Verify: each accepted hypothesis maps to test, issue, or documented non-applicability.
  • SEC-I03 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on admin controls, blacklist/pause coverage, and obvious value-flow bugs. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged.
  • SEC-I04 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged.
  • SEC-I05 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on frontend signing/risk communication. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged.
  • SEC-I06 Verify LLM-generated exploit scripts cannot overwhelm LocalTerra/API without hitting rate limits or documented local-only limits. Verify: controlled local load test evidence and 429 behavior.
  • SEC-I07 Keep the prompt pack and exploit matrix updated after each security incident or major feature. Verify: checklist item added to release process.

SEC-J: Prioritization for < $100k TVL

  • SEC-J01 Mark P0 launch blockers: admin controls broken, value-flow invariant failing, deploy/runbook missing, or user cannot see pause/blacklist/rate-limit risk. Verify: issue labels/priorities reflect blockers.
  • SEC-J02 Mark P1 must-fix-before-growth: formal audit prep, broader fuzzing, richer monitoring, bounty policy, multisig hardening. Verify: follow-up issues exist but do not block small launch unless P0 evidence appears.
  • SEC-J03 Mark accepted low-ROI items: expensive formal verification, complex oracle defenses not used in settlement, enterprise SOC workflows, advanced bot mitigation. Verify: documented risk acceptance with revisit threshold.
  • SEC-J04 Define TVL/user thresholds that upgrade the security posture: e.g. $100k, $250k, $1M TVL or >100 active users. Verify: docs list required actions per threshold.
  • SEC-J05 Require prelaunch signoff from developer on P0 category completion and residual risks. Verify: final issue comment summarizes pass/fail and open risks.
## Context and Target Posture Assumptions: projected launch is **< $100k TVL** and **< 100 users**. Security should focus on high-value, low-complexity defenses that reduce obvious loss, improve incident communication, and make historical exploit replay harder. We should assume attackers will use LLM agents and historical hack data to generate tests, prompts, fuzz cases, and exploit scripts against this repo. Non-goal: defending against highly resourced/sophisticated attackers with bespoke zero-days. Goal: avoid preventable loss, user confusion, admin-key mistakes, known CosmWasm/Cosmos-stack exploit classes, and weak incident response. Relevant historical themes to model: Terra/Astroport IBC-hooks reentrancy/infinite-mint exposure, Osmosis pool-share accounting bug, Levana oracle/update-timing manipulation, malicious token/contract registration, admin-key compromise, frontend wallet/signing confusion, indexer/API amplification, SQL/query injection, event spoofing, stale deployment/runbook drift. ## Definition of Done Each checked item must include evidence in an MR, issue comment, test output, runbook link, or explicit risk acceptance. Prefer automated tests where feasible; use manual runbook verification only when automation has poor ROI for the current TVL/user count. ## SEC-A: Risk Scope and User Communication - [x] **SEC-A01** Define the public security posture for small-TVL launch: capped expectations, unaudited/limited-audit language, admin controls, and known residual risks. **Verify:** docs page or launch notice exists and is linked from the dApp/footer. - [x] **SEC-A02** Write user-facing copy for trading blacklist, pair pause, wrap pause, rate limit, indexer outage, and excessive slippage states. **Verify:** frontend tests assert clear messages and disabled CTAs where applicable. - [x] **SEC-A03** Add a “what happens during an incident” explanation: pause/blacklist/rate-limit actions, expected user impact, and how funds/LP positions are handled. **Verify:** runbook or FAQ reviewed by developer and linked from security docs. - [x] **SEC-A04** Document that factory trading blacklist is different from fee-discount tier 255. **Verify:** docs mention tier 255 does not halt trading and tests cover actual blacklist behavior. - [x] **SEC-A05** Document user recovery paths after unpause/unblacklist, including LP withdraw, limit cancel/claim, and swap retry. **Verify:** LocalTerra or cw-multi-test evidence shows recovery after control removal. - [x] **SEC-A06** Add launch decision language: when to pause launch, when to launch with accepted risk, and when to block launch. **Verify:** checklist includes explicit go/no-go section signed off before production deploy. - [x] **SEC-A07** Create a concise security contact/escalation path for users reporting suspicious trades or UI states. **Verify:** visible docs issue/MR with contact path and expected response window. ## SEC-B: Admin Controls, Governance, and Emergency Authority - [x] **SEC-B01** Verify governance-only access for blacklist wallet/token/pair operations. **Verify:** contract tests fail for non-governance callers and pass for governance. - [x] **SEC-B02** Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. **Verify:** contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution. - [x] **SEC-B03** Verify token blacklist blocks both directions for every pair containing the token. **Verify:** tests cover offer-token and ask-token directions. - [x] **SEC-B04** Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. **Verify:** tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair. - [x] **SEC-B05** Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. **Verify:** contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy. - [x] **SEC-B06** Verify wrap mapper pause blocks wrapping/unwrapping and produces clear UI copy. **Verify:** frontend unit tests and LocalTerra smoke test. - [x] **SEC-B07** Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. **Verify:** contract auth matrix tests and docs update. - [x] **SEC-B08** Verify LP admin rotation is bounded/paginated and cannot fan out unbounded during `UpdateConfig`. **Verify:** existing #277 invariant tests plus docs/runbook step. - [x] **SEC-B09** Verify emergency controls are executable from the actual planned governance wallet/multisig, not just local test keys. **Verify:** testnet/local dry run using same signing flow or documented manual rehearsal. - [x] **SEC-B10** Document admin-key custody for small launch: multisig preferred, named backup signer, no single hot wallet for mainnet if avoidable. **Verify:** deployment runbook has signer list and rotation process. - [x] **SEC-B11** Add an emergency “pause/blacklist/unpause/unblacklist” command cookbook. **Verify:** commands are copy-pastable, parameterized, and rehearsed on LocalTerra. - [x] **SEC-B12** Add explicit criteria for blacklisting during incidents: confirmed exploit signer, malicious token, compromised pair, and false-positive rollback. **Verify:** incident runbook has decision tree and rollback step. ## SEC-C: Smart Contract Value-Flow Invariants - [x] **SEC-C01** Verify constant-product swap accounting cannot return more value than reserves permit after fee/spread. **Verify:** unit/property tests for swap math, including edge reserves and tiny amounts. - [x] **SEC-C02** Verify provide/withdraw liquidity share accounting cannot mint excess LP shares like the Osmosis pool-share exploit class. **Verify:** tests cover add/remove round trips, asymmetric deposits, initial liquidity, and repeated exploit-style cycles. - [x] **SEC-C03** Verify commission/treasury transfer is atomic and pair does not retain fees unexpectedly. **Verify:** contract tests compare balances before/after successful and reverted swaps. - [x] **SEC-C04** Verify `max_spread`, `min_return`, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. **Verify:** tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants. - [x] **SEC-C05** Verify native-token rejection remains enforced until native/wrap support is intentionally enabled. **Verify:** contract tests reject `AssetInfo::NativeToken` where documented. - [x] **SEC-C06** Verify CW20 code ID whitelist blocks malicious/unapproved token contracts from pair creation. **Verify:** create-pair tests include unwhitelisted CW20 and approved CW20. - [x] **SEC-C07** Verify pair-creation fee and one-create-per-block gate reduce spam/griefing and are documented. **Verify:** tests cover no fee, wrong denom, overpay refund, same-block second create, and governance fee update. - [x] **SEC-C08** Verify hooks are governance-only, bounded/trusted, and hook revert behavior is intentional. **Verify:** tests cover non-governance hook registration rejection and hook revert causing swap failure. - [x] **SEC-C09** Verify router trusted-trader field cannot steal another wallet’s fee discount. **Verify:** tests cover untrusted router `trader` spoofing and trusted router success. - [x] **SEC-C10** Verify fee-discount EOA-only self-registration and governance-only Tier 0 / Tier 255 behavior. **Verify:** tests cover contract self-registration rejection and governance registration. - [x] **SEC-C11** Verify lazy deregistration on insufficient CL8Y balance never grants stale discount for the current swap. **Verify:** tests assert discount bps is zero once balance falls below tier. - [x] **SEC-C12** Verify limit order escrow cannot be stolen or stranded by fill/cancel/claim paths. **Verify:** tests cover partial fill, full fill, cancel, expiry park, claim refund, and pause/blacklist interactions. - [x] **SEC-C13** Verify hybrid swap consumes bounded maker fills and cannot exceed configured scan/fill budgets. **Verify:** tests cover max maker fills, expired head orders, and skipped overflow behavior. - [x] **SEC-C14** Verify contract migrations preserve all critical storage invariants: governance, treasury, pair registry, LP admin, blacklist, discounts, and limit books. **Verify:** migration tests from deployed versions to current version. - [x] **SEC-C15** Verify no unbounded iteration is reachable by public users on hot paths. **Verify:** gas-focused tests or code review notes for factory, pair, router, and limit book paths. ## SEC-D: Historical Cosmos/CosmWasm Exploit Replay Matrix - [x] **SEC-D01** Create a historical exploit matrix with date, protocol, root cause, affected component, our equivalent surface, mitigation, and verification. **Verify:** committed docs table with links to tests/issues. - [x] **SEC-D02** Model Terra/Astroport IBC-hooks reentrancy/infinite-mint as a threat to bridged/CW20 assets and chain dependency patching. **Verify:** deployment runbook checks chain version/IBC-hooks exposure and records whether app contracts directly use IBC hooks. - [x] **SEC-D03** Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. **Verify:** code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable. - [x] **SEC-D04** Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. **Verify:** exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance. - [x] **SEC-D05** Model Levana oracle/update-timing manipulation as route/quote/stale-price risk even if not using external oracle for settlement. **Verify:** route/slippage tests and docs clarify quotes are advisory until on-chain execution. - [x] **SEC-D06** Model malicious CW20 token behavior: transfer failure, fee-on-transfer, rebase-like balance changes, callback griefing. **Verify:** tests or documented risk acceptance for whitelist-only token admission. - [x] **SEC-D07** Model fake pair/fake event emission against the indexer. **Verify:** tests prove `_contract_address` scoping and factory provenance reject clone/fake pair events. - [x] **SEC-D08** Model SQL/query injection against public API sort, interval, ticker, pair, and CSV/export routes. **Verify:** indexer security tests cover malicious strings and return 400/404 without raw SQL errors. - [x] **SEC-D09** Model LCD amplification by LLM agents crawling orderbooks/routes. **Verify:** rate-limit tests, LCD query-budget tests, and cache tests on heavy routes. - [x] **SEC-D10** Model admin-key compromise as the most realistic high-impact attack for small TVL. **Verify:** governance custody/runbook review and emergency rotation rehearsal. - [x] **SEC-D11** Model frontend wallet phishing/signing confusion. **Verify:** wallet signing UI clearly names action, pair, amount, max spread/min return, and chain; tests assert dangerous action labels. - [x] **SEC-D12** Model stale deployment artifact or missed security patch like Terra’s missed IBC patch. **Verify:** deploy runbook records git SHA, contract code IDs, chain versions, and post-deploy verification commands. ## SEC-E: Frontend, Wallet, and User-Safety UX - [x] **SEC-E01** Verify dApp disables swap/provide/withdraw/limit actions when blacklist check blocks wallet/token/pair. **Verify:** frontend tests across Swap, Pool, Trade, Limits/Portfolio paths. - [x] **SEC-E02** Verify pair pause banner is visible and action-specific copy is clear. **Verify:** frontend tests assert banner and disabled actions. - [x] **SEC-E03** Verify wrap pause state disables wrapping with clear copy. **Verify:** frontend unit test plus LocalTerra smoke test. - [x] **SEC-E04** Verify rate-limit responses show calm retry guidance, not generic broken-app errors. **Verify:** frontend tests mock 429 and assert displayed message. - [x] **SEC-E05** Verify indexer outage and LCD 502 states distinguish “data unavailable” from “funds at risk.” **Verify:** tests for API error mapping and visible copy. - [x] **SEC-E06** Verify extreme slippage blocks retail submit unless Expert Mode is explicitly enabled. **Verify:** tests for >30% and ≥99% slippage behavior. - [x] **SEC-E07** Verify route display aligns with actual submit operations and does not show duplicate/conflicting routes. **Verify:** route display tests and LocalTerra swap trace. - [x] **SEC-E08** Verify wallet signing fee guard prevents known Terra Station/LocalTerra stale-fee confusion where applicable. **Verify:** existing fee guard tests and manual wallet QA notes. - [x] **SEC-E09** Verify risk acknowledgement modal/copy is shown for launch-risk areas without becoming click-through noise. **Verify:** UX review and tests for persistence/reset behavior. - [x] **SEC-E10** Verify external links/explorer links are sanitized and cannot inject script or misleading URLs. **Verify:** unit tests for explorer URL builder and link rendering. ## SEC-F: Indexer, API, and Data Integrity - [x] **SEC-F01** Verify production API rate limits are nonzero by default and cannot be disabled accidentally under `RUN_MODE=prod`. **Verify:** indexer tests and startup log check. - [x] **SEC-F02** Verify LCD-heavy routes have stricter limits than ordinary read routes. **Verify:** tests show heavy-route 429 under configured threshold. - [x] **SEC-F03** Verify API uses socket peer IP only unless a trusted proxy design is implemented. **Verify:** tests/config docs reject spoofable forwarded-header extraction. - [x] **SEC-F04** Verify IPv4-only default or documented IPv6 anti-abuse strategy. **Verify:** config tests and deployment runbook mention `API_IPV6_ENABLED`. - [x] **SEC-F05** Verify query caps lower-bound and upper-bound every list/depth/limit route. **Verify:** integration tests cover negative, zero, huge, and valid values. - [x] **SEC-F06** Verify internal DB/LCD errors are sanitized and do not leak SQL, URLs, stack traces, or secrets. **Verify:** security tests assert generic 500/502 bodies. - [x] **SEC-F07** Verify CORS allowlist is explicit for production and dev. **Verify:** tests for allowed/disallowed origins and deploy env review. - [x] **SEC-F08** Verify block ingest fails safe on bad timestamps, pagination gaps, DB errors, and reorg hash mismatch. **Verify:** indexer ingestion hardening tests and reorg runbook. - [x] **SEC-F09** Verify swap/fill/lifecycle dedup prevents replay/double counting. **Verify:** unique indexes plus replay tests. - [x] **SEC-F10** Verify hybrid volume reconciliation cannot double-count maker fills as headline volume. **Verify:** indexer tests for pool/book leg sums and API aggregate totals. - [x] **SEC-F11** Verify factory pair provenance prevents fake pair indexing. **Verify:** malicious clone tests and production `FACTORY_ADDRESS` required. - [x] **SEC-F12** Verify CSV export cannot produce formula injection surprises for common spreadsheet clients. **Verify:** review/export tests or documented risk acceptance if all exported fields are controlled numeric/address/hash values. - [x] **SEC-F13** Verify logs avoid private keys, mnemonics, bearer tokens, database URLs, and raw user secrets. **Verify:** grep/static review and test fixtures where feasible. ## SEC-G: Monitoring, Detection, and Incident Response - [x] **SEC-G01** Define minimum launch monitoring: contract error spikes, indexer lag, API 429/5xx, large swaps, large LP withdraws, blacklist hits, pause state changes. **Verify:** runbook lists commands/dashboards/log queries. - [x] **SEC-G02** Add a simple anomaly checklist for small TVL: single wallet drains >X% pool, repeated add/remove profit loops, sudden route slippage, many failed txs, LCD-heavy route flood. **Verify:** incident runbook includes thresholds and response actions. - [x] **SEC-G03** Verify admin can identify top pools by TVL/liquidity quickly during incident. **Verify:** command/query in runbook returns pairs sorted by approximate value or quote liquidity. - [x] **SEC-G04** Verify admin can identify suspicious wallet/pair/token quickly. **Verify:** indexer/API queries or SQL snippets in runbook. - [x] **SEC-G05** Verify emergency communications template exists for pause, blacklist, exploit investigation, false alarm, and postmortem. **Verify:** docs include templates ready to paste. - [x] **SEC-G06** Verify incident timeline template captures time, tx hash, wallet, token, pair, admin action, and user impact. **Verify:** runbook includes blank template. - [x] **SEC-G07** Verify restore procedure requires root cause or explicit risk acceptance before unpause/unblacklist. **Verify:** runbook has restore checklist. - [x] **SEC-G08** Verify no reliance on chain halt as the primary dApp incident control. **Verify:** runbook prioritizes app-level pause/blacklist/rate-limit before external validator coordination. ## SEC-H: Deployment and Release Runbooks - [x] **SEC-H01** Write production deploy runbook with prerequisites, git SHA, contract artifacts, code IDs, addresses, governance/treasury, env vars, and rollback notes. **Verify:** runbook can be followed by another developer on LocalTerra/testnet. - [x] **SEC-H02** Verify LocalTerra deploy exercises real pair-creation fee and admin controls. **Verify:** deploy transcript or automated check references created pair, fee, pause, blacklist, unpause. - [x] **SEC-H03** Verify post-deploy contract queries match expected config: governance, treasury, default fee, whitelisted CW20 code IDs, trusted routers, hooks, blacklist empty/default. **Verify:** scripted query output attached to release issue. - [x] **SEC-H04** Verify frontend `.env` and indexer `.env` addresses match deployed contracts exactly. **Verify:** post-deploy script compares env files against chain query output. - [x] **SEC-H05** Verify migrations are rehearsed from previous deployed code IDs and rollback limitations are documented. **Verify:** migration test output and runbook note. - [x] **SEC-H06** Verify secrets are not committed and CI/CD variables are scoped. **Verify:** secret scan/grep and GitLab variable review. - [x] **SEC-H07** Verify dependency audit is proportionate: `cargo audit`/Rust review where practical, npm audit triage for high/critical runtime deps, no broad yak-shave for dev-only noise. **Verify:** audit output or risk-accepted notes. - [x] **SEC-H08** Verify release checklist requires tests before deploy: contracts, indexer lib/integration as applicable, frontend unit tests, and at least one LocalTerra swap/limit smoke. **Verify:** release issue has pasted commands and results. - [x] **SEC-H09** Verify rollback/forward-fix decision tree for frontend-only issue, indexer issue, contract issue, and chain dependency issue. **Verify:** runbook section reviewed. ## SEC-I: LLM-Agent Adversary Testing - [x] **SEC-I01** Build an “LLM attacker prompt pack” from historical incidents and ask agents to generate exploit hypotheses against this repo. **Verify:** saved prompts/results and triaged findings. - [x] **SEC-I02** Convert plausible LLM-generated exploit hypotheses into regression tests or explicit risk acceptances. **Verify:** each accepted hypothesis maps to test, issue, or documented non-applicability. - [x] **SEC-I03** Run an agent-assisted review focused only on admin controls, blacklist/pause coverage, and obvious value-flow bugs. **Verify:** review output linked and findings triaged. - [x] **SEC-I04** Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. **Verify:** review output linked and findings triaged. - [x] **SEC-I05** Run an agent-assisted review focused only on frontend signing/risk communication. **Verify:** review output linked and findings triaged. - [x] **SEC-I06** Verify LLM-generated exploit scripts cannot overwhelm LocalTerra/API without hitting rate limits or documented local-only limits. **Verify:** controlled local load test evidence and 429 behavior. - [x] **SEC-I07** Keep the prompt pack and exploit matrix updated after each security incident or major feature. **Verify:** checklist item added to release process. ## SEC-J: Prioritization for < $100k TVL - [x] **SEC-J01** Mark P0 launch blockers: admin controls broken, value-flow invariant failing, deploy/runbook missing, or user cannot see pause/blacklist/rate-limit risk. **Verify:** issue labels/priorities reflect blockers. - [x] **SEC-J02** Mark P1 must-fix-before-growth: formal audit prep, broader fuzzing, richer monitoring, bounty policy, multisig hardening. **Verify:** follow-up issues exist but do not block small launch unless P0 evidence appears. - [x] **SEC-J03** Mark accepted low-ROI items: expensive formal verification, complex oracle defenses not used in settlement, enterprise SOC workflows, advanced bot mitigation. **Verify:** documented risk acceptance with revisit threshold. - [x] **SEC-J04** Define TVL/user thresholds that upgrade the security posture: e.g. $100k, $250k, $1M TVL or >100 active users. **Verify:** docs list required actions per threshold. - [x] **SEC-J05** Require prelaunch signoff from developer on P0 category completion and residual risks. **Verify:** final issue comment summarizes pass/fail and open risks.
PlasticDigits commented 2026-06-14 12:03:18 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

assigned to @totdking

assigned to @totdking
totdking commented 2026-06-18 15:15:20 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-A04 Document that factory trading blacklist is different from fee-discount tier 255. Verify: docs mention tier 255 does not halt trading and tests cover actual blacklist behavior. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-A04 Document that factory trading blacklist is different from fee\-discount tier 255\. Verify: docs mention tier 255 does not halt trading and tests cover actual blacklist behavior\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-18 15:21:25 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-A05 Document user recovery paths after unpause/unblacklist, including LP withdraw, limit cancel/claim, and swap retry. Verify: LocalTerra or cw-multi-test evidence shows recovery after control removal. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-A05 Document user recovery paths after unpause/unblacklist, including LP withdraw, limit cancel/claim, and swap retry\. Verify: LocalTerra or cw\-multi\-test evidence shows recovery after control removal\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-18 15:38:05 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
### A: Risk Scope and User Communication * SEC-A01 : https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/387 * SEC-A02 : https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/388, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/389 * SEC-A03: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/390 * SEC-A06: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/391 * SEC-A07: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/392
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:14:54 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B01 Verify governance-only access for blacklist wallet/token/pair operations. Verify: contract tests fail for non-governance callers and pass for governance. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B01 Verify governance\-only access for blacklist wallet/token/pair operations\. Verify: contract tests fail for non\-governance callers and pass for governance\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:14:57 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop\. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:14:59 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B03 Verify token blacklist blocks both directions for every pair containing the token. Verify: tests cover offer-token and ask-token directions. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B03 Verify token blacklist blocks both directions for every pair containing the token\. Verify: tests cover offer\-token and ask\-token directions\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:03 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs\. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:05 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy\. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled\-state tests match the documented policy\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:07 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths\. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:10 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths\. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:10 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B08 Verify LP admin rotation is bounded/paginated and cannot fan out unbounded during UpdateConfig. Verify: existing #277 invariant tests plus docs/runbook step. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B08 Verify LP admin rotation is bounded/paginated and cannot fan out unbounded during UpdateConfig\. Verify: existing \#277 invariant tests plus docs/runbook step\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:48 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop\. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:52 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs\. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:15:54 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy\. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled\-state tests match the documented policy\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:17:03 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths\. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:54:44 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C02 Verify provide/withdraw liquidity share accounting cannot mint excess LP shares like the Osmosis pool-share exploit class. Verify: tests cover add/remove round trips, asymmetric deposits, initial liquidity, and repeated exploit-style cycles. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C02 Verify provide/withdraw liquidity share accounting cannot mint excess LP shares like the Osmosis pool\-share exploit class\. Verify: tests cover add/remove round trips, asymmetric deposits, initial liquidity, and repeated exploit\-style cycles\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:54:47 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C04 Verify max_spread, min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C04 Verify max\_spread, min\_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths\. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:54:49 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C05 Verify native-token rejection remains enforced until native/wrap support is intentionally enabled. Verify: contract tests reject AssetInfo::NativeToken where documented. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C05 Verify native\-token rejection remains enforced until native/wrap support is intentionally enabled\. Verify: contract tests reject AssetInfo::NativeToken where documented\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:54:53 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C06 Verify CW20 code ID whitelist blocks malicious/unapproved token contracts from pair creation. Verify: create-pair tests include unwhitelisted CW20 and approved CW20. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C06 Verify CW20 code ID whitelist blocks malicious/unapproved token contracts from pair creation\. Verify: create\-pair tests include unwhitelisted CW20 and approved CW20\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:55:03 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C08 Verify hooks are governance-only, bounded/trusted, and hook revert behavior is intentional. Verify: tests cover non-governance hook registration rejection and hook revert causing swap failure. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C08 Verify hooks are governance\-only, bounded/trusted, and hook revert behavior is intentional\. Verify: tests cover non\-governance hook registration rejection and hook revert causing swap failure\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:55:05 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C09 Verify router trusted-trader field cannot steal another wallet’s fee discount. Verify: tests cover untrusted router trader spoofing and trusted router success. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C09 Verify router trusted\-trader field cannot steal another wallet’s fee discount\. Verify: tests cover untrusted router trader spoofing and trusted router success\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:55:07 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C10 Verify fee-discount EOA-only self-registration and governance-only Tier 0 / Tier 255 behavior. Verify: tests cover contract self-registration rejection and governance registration. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C10 Verify fee\-discount EOA\-only self\-registration and governance\-only Tier 0 / Tier 255 behavior\. Verify: tests cover contract self\-registration rejection and governance registration\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:55:18 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C11 Verify lazy deregistration on insufficient CL8Y balance never grants stale discount for the current swap. Verify: tests assert discount bps is zero once balance falls below tier. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C11 Verify lazy deregistration on insufficient CL8Y balance never grants stale discount for the current swap\. Verify: tests assert discount bps is zero once balance falls below tier\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:55:20 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C12 Verify limit order escrow cannot be stolen or stranded by fill/cancel/claim paths. Verify: tests cover partial fill, full fill, cancel, expiry park, claim refund, and pause/blacklist interactions. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C12 Verify limit order escrow cannot be stolen or stranded by fill/cancel/claim paths\. Verify: tests cover partial fill, full fill, cancel, expiry park, claim refund, and pause/blacklist interactions\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:55:29 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C13 Verify hybrid swap consumes bounded maker fills and cannot exceed configured scan/fill budgets. Verify: tests cover max maker fills, expired head orders, and skipped overflow behavior. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C13 Verify hybrid swap consumes bounded maker fills and cannot exceed configured scan/fill budgets\. Verify: tests cover max maker fills, expired head orders, and skipped overflow behavior\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:55:31 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C15 Verify no unbounded iteration is reachable by public users on hot paths. Verify: gas-focused tests or code review notes for factory, pair, router, and limit book paths. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C15 Verify no unbounded iteration is reachable by public users on hot paths\. Verify: gas\-focused tests or code review notes for factory, pair, router, and limit book paths\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 10:57:15 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
### SEC-B: Admin Controls, Governance, and Emergency Authority * B02 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/393 * B04 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/394 * B05 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/395 * B06 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/396 * B09 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/397 * B10 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/398 * B11 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/399 * B12 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/400
totdking commented 2026-06-19 11:06:01 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C07 Verify pair-creation fee and one-create-per-block gate reduce spam/griefing and are documented. Verify: tests cover no fee, wrong denom, overpay refund, same-block second create, and governance fee update. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C07 Verify pair\-creation fee and one\-create\-per\-block gate reduce spam/griefing and are documented\. Verify: tests cover no fee, wrong denom, overpay refund, same\-block second create, and governance fee update\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 11:14:22 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C04 Verify max_spread, min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C04 Verify max\_spread, min\_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths\. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-06-19 11:16:15 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
### SEC-C : Smart Contract Value-Flow Invariants * C-01 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/401 * C-03 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/402 * C-04 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/404 * C-14 - https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/405
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:06:49 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
### SEC-D: Historical Cosmos/CosmWasm Exploit Replay Matrix * D-01: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/406 * D-02: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/407 * D-10: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/408 * D-11: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/409 * D-12: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/410
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:06:58 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC\-hooks exploit path\. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:06:59 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC\-hooks exploit path\. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:06:59 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D04 Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. Verify: exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D04 Model Osmosis LP\-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction\. Verify: exploit\-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:01 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC\-hooks exploit path\. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:01 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D04 Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. Verify: exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D04 Model Osmosis LP\-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction\. Verify: exploit\-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:01 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D05 Model Levana oracle/update-timing manipulation as route/quote/stale-price risk even if not using external oracle for settlement. Verify: route/slippage tests and docs clarify quotes are advisory until on-chain execution. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D05 Model Levana oracle/update\-timing manipulation as route/quote/stale\-price risk even if not using external oracle for settlement\. Verify: route/slippage tests and docs clarify quotes are advisory until on\-chain execution\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:05 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D04 Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. Verify: exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D04 Model Osmosis LP\-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction\. Verify: exploit\-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:08 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D06 Model malicious CW20 token behavior: transfer failure, fee-on-transfer, rebase-like balance changes, callback griefing. Verify: tests or documented risk acceptance for whitelist-only token admission. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D06 Model malicious CW20 token behavior: transfer failure, fee\-on\-transfer, rebase\-like balance changes, callback griefing\. Verify: tests or documented risk acceptance for whitelist\-only token admission\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:10 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D07 Model fake pair/fake event emission against the indexer. Verify: tests prove _contract_address scoping and factory provenance reject clone/fake pair events. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D07 Model fake pair/fake event emission against the indexer\. Verify: tests prove \_contract\_address scoping and factory provenance reject clone/fake pair events\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:12 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D08 Model SQL/query injection against public API sort, interval, ticker, pair, and CSV/export routes. Verify: indexer security tests cover malicious strings and return 400/404 without raw SQL errors. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D08 Model SQL/query injection against public API sort, interval, ticker, pair, and CSV/export routes\. Verify: indexer security tests cover malicious strings and return 400/404 without raw SQL errors\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-19 12:07:15 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D09 Model LCD amplification by LLM agents crawling orderbooks/routes. Verify: rate-limit tests, LCD query-budget tests, and cache tests on heavy routes. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D09 Model LCD amplification by LLM agents crawling orderbooks/routes\. Verify: rate\-limit tests, LCD query\-budget tests, and cache tests on heavy routes\.** as completed
PlasticDigits commented 2026-06-19 13:24:04 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in merge request !935

mentioned in merge request !935
Brouie commented 2026-06-28 23:24:44 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #337

mentioned in issue #337
totdking commented 2026-06-29 12:05:42 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E02 Verify pair pause banner is visible and action-specific copy is clear. Verify: frontend tests assert banner and disabled actions. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E02 Verify pair pause banner is visible and action\-specific copy is clear\. Verify: frontend tests assert banner and disabled actions\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 12:05:44 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E03 Verify wrap pause state disables wrapping with clear copy. Verify: frontend unit test plus LocalTerra smoke test. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E03 Verify wrap pause state disables wrapping with clear copy\. Verify: frontend unit test plus LocalTerra smoke test\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 14:52:58 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E06 Verify extreme slippage blocks retail submit unless Expert Mode is explicitly enabled. Verify: tests for >30% and ≥99% slippage behavior. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E06 Verify extreme slippage blocks retail submit unless Expert Mode is explicitly enabled\. Verify: tests for \>30% and ≥99% slippage behavior\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 14:53:00 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E09 Verify risk acknowledgement modal/copy is shown for launch-risk areas without becoming click-through noise. Verify: UX review and tests for persistence/reset behavior. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E09 Verify risk acknowledgement modal/copy is shown for launch\-risk areas without becoming click\-through noise\. Verify: UX review and tests for persistence/reset behavior\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:31:47 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
## SEC-E: Frontend, Wallet, and User-Safety UX * E-01: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/425 * E-04: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/426 * E-05: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/427 * E-07: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/428 * E-08: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/429 * E-10: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/430
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:07 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
## SEC-F : Indexer, API, and Data Integrity * F-05: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/431 * F-12: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/432 * F-13: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/433
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:19 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F01 Verify production API rate limits are nonzero by default and cannot be disabled accidentally under RUN_MODE=prod. Verify: indexer tests and startup log check. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F01 Verify production API rate limits are nonzero by default and cannot be disabled accidentally under RUN\_MODE\=prod\. Verify: indexer tests and startup log check\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:34 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F02 Verify LCD-heavy routes have stricter limits than ordinary read routes. Verify: tests show heavy-route 429 under configured threshold. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F02 Verify LCD\-heavy routes have stricter limits than ordinary read routes\. Verify: tests show heavy\-route 429 under configured threshold\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:36 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F03 Verify API uses socket peer IP only unless a trusted proxy design is implemented. Verify: tests/config docs reject spoofable forwarded-header extraction. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F03 Verify API uses socket peer IP only unless a trusted proxy design is implemented\. Verify: tests/config docs reject spoofable forwarded\-header extraction\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:41 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F04 Verify IPv4-only default or documented IPv6 anti-abuse strategy. Verify: config tests and deployment runbook mention API_IPV6_ENABLED. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F04 Verify IPv4\-only default or documented IPv6 anti\-abuse strategy\. Verify: config tests and deployment runbook mention API\_IPV6\_ENABLED\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:43 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F06 Verify internal DB/LCD errors are sanitized and do not leak SQL, URLs, stack traces, or secrets. Verify: security tests assert generic 500/502 bodies. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F06 Verify internal DB/LCD errors are sanitized and do not leak SQL, URLs, stack traces, or secrets\. Verify: security tests assert generic 500/502 bodies\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:45 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F07 Verify CORS allowlist is explicit for production and dev. Verify: tests for allowed/disallowed origins and deploy env review. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F07 Verify CORS allowlist is explicit for production and dev\. Verify: tests for allowed/disallowed origins and deploy env review\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:48 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F08 Verify block ingest fails safe on bad timestamps, pagination gaps, DB errors, and reorg hash mismatch. Verify: indexer ingestion hardening tests and reorg runbook. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F08 Verify block ingest fails safe on bad timestamps, pagination gaps, DB errors, and reorg hash mismatch\. Verify: indexer ingestion hardening tests and reorg runbook\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:50 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F09 Verify swap/fill/lifecycle dedup prevents replay/double counting. Verify: unique indexes plus replay tests. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F09 Verify swap/fill/lifecycle dedup prevents replay/double counting\. Verify: unique indexes plus replay tests\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:52 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F10 Verify hybrid volume reconciliation cannot double-count maker fills as headline volume. Verify: indexer tests for pool/book leg sums and API aggregate totals. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F10 Verify hybrid volume reconciliation cannot double\-count maker fills as headline volume\. Verify: indexer tests for pool/book leg sums and API aggregate totals\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 15:39:54 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F11 Verify factory pair provenance prevents fake pair indexing. Verify: malicious clone tests and production FACTORY_ADDRESS required. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F11 Verify factory pair provenance prevents fake pair indexing\. Verify: malicious clone tests and production FACTORY\_ADDRESS required\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 16:04:43 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G08 Verify no reliance on chain halt as the primary dApp incident control. Verify: runbook prioritizes app-level pause/blacklist/rate-limit before external validator coordination. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G08 Verify no reliance on chain halt as the primary dApp incident control\. Verify: runbook prioritizes app\-level pause/blacklist/rate\-limit before external validator coordination\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-29 16:15:50 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
## SEC-G: Monitoring, Detection, and Incident Response * G-01: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/434 * G-02: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/435 * G-03: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/436 * G-04: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/437 * G-05: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/438 * G-06: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/439 * G-07: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/440
totdking commented 2026-06-30 10:08:06 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H01 Write production deploy runbook with prerequisites, git SHA, contract artifacts, code IDs, addresses, governance/treasury, env vars, and rollback notes. Verify: runbook can be followed by another developer on LocalTerra/testnet. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H01 Write production deploy runbook with prerequisites, git SHA, contract artifacts, code IDs, addresses, governance/treasury, env vars, and rollback notes\. Verify: runbook can be followed by another developer on LocalTerra/testnet\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-30 10:08:08 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H02 Verify LocalTerra deploy exercises real pair-creation fee and admin controls. Verify: deploy transcript or automated check references created pair, fee, pause, blacklist, unpause. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H02 Verify LocalTerra deploy exercises real pair\-creation fee and admin controls\. Verify: deploy transcript or automated check references created pair, fee, pause, blacklist, unpause\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-30 10:08:12 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H06 Verify secrets are not committed and CI/CD variables are scoped. Verify: secret scan/grep and GitLab variable review. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H06 Verify secrets are not committed and CI/CD variables are scoped\. Verify: secret scan/grep and GitLab variable review\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-30 10:08:15 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H07 Verify dependency audit is proportionate: cargo audit/Rust review where practical, npm audit triage for high/critical runtime deps, no broad yak-shave for dev-only noise. Verify: audit output or risk-accepted notes. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H07 Verify dependency audit is proportionate: cargo audit/Rust review where practical, npm audit triage for high/critical runtime deps, no broad yak\-shave for dev\-only noise\. Verify: audit output or risk\-accepted notes\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-30 10:24:12 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
## SEC-H: Deployment and Release Runbooks * H-03: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/441 * H-04: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/442 * H-05: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/443 * H-08: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/444 * H-09: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/445
totdking commented 2026-06-30 15:09:45 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I01 Build an “LLM attacker prompt pack” from historical incidents and ask agents to generate exploit hypotheses against this repo. Verify: saved prompts/results and triaged findings. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I01 Build an “LLM attacker prompt pack” from historical incidents and ask agents to generate exploit hypotheses against this repo\. Verify: saved prompts/results and triaged findings\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-06-30 18:37:54 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)
### SEC-I: LLM-Agent Adversary Testing * I-01: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/446 * I-02: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/447, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/448, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/449, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/450, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/451 * I-03: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/452, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/455, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/456, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/457 * I-04: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/453, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/458, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/459, * I-05: https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/454, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/460, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/461, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/462, https://gitlab.com/PlasticDigits/cl8y-dex-terraclassic/-/work_items/463
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:01 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #464

mentioned in issue #464
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:02 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #465

mentioned in issue #465
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:03 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #466

mentioned in issue #466
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:06 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #468

mentioned in issue #468
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:09 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #470

mentioned in issue #470
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:10 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #471

mentioned in issue #471
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:13 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #467

mentioned in issue #467
Brouie commented 2026-07-01 12:57:19 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #469

mentioned in issue #469
totdking commented 2026-07-01 13:19:31 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-J01 Mark P0 launch blockers: admin controls broken, value-flow invariant failing, deploy/runbook missing, or user cannot see pause/blacklist/rate-limit risk. Verify: issue labels/priorities reflect blockers. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-J01 Mark P0 launch blockers: admin controls broken, value\-flow invariant failing, deploy/runbook missing, or user cannot see pause/blacklist/rate\-limit risk\. Verify: issue labels/priorities reflect blockers\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 13:32:33 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-J02 Mark P1 must-fix-before-growth: formal audit prep, broader fuzzing, richer monitoring, bounty policy, multisig hardening. Verify: follow-up issues exist but do not block small launch unless P0 evidence appears. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-J02 Mark P1 must\-fix\-before\-growth: formal audit prep, broader fuzzing, richer monitoring, bounty policy, multisig hardening\. Verify: follow\-up issues exist but do not block small launch unless P0 evidence appears\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 13:34:59 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-J03 Mark accepted low-ROI items: expensive formal verification, complex oracle defenses not used in settlement, enterprise SOC workflows, advanced bot mitigation. Verify: documented risk acceptance with revisit threshold. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-J03 Mark accepted low\-ROI items: expensive formal verification, complex oracle defenses not used in settlement, enterprise SOC workflows, advanced bot mitigation\. Verify: documented risk acceptance with revisit threshold\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 13:35:27 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-J04 Define TVL/user thresholds that upgrade the security posture: e.g. $100k, $250k, $1M TVL or >100 active users. Verify: docs list required actions per threshold. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-J04 Define TVL/user thresholds that upgrade the security posture: e\.g\. $100k, $250k, $1M TVL or \>100 active users\. Verify: docs list required actions per threshold\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 13:50:43 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-A01 Define the public security posture for small-TVL launch: capped expectations, unaudited/limited-audit language, admin controls, and known residual risks. Verify: docs page or launch notice exists and is linked from the dApp/footer. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-A01 Define the public security posture for small\-TVL launch: capped expectations, unaudited/limited\-audit language, admin controls, and known residual risks\. Verify: docs page or launch notice exists and is linked from the dApp/footer\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 13:51:53 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-A02 Write user-facing copy for trading blacklist, pair pause, wrap pause, rate limit, indexer outage, and excessive slippage states. Verify: frontend tests assert clear messages and disabled CTAs where applicable. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-A02 Write user\-facing copy for trading blacklist, pair pause, wrap pause, rate limit, indexer outage, and excessive slippage states\. Verify: frontend tests assert clear messages and disabled CTAs where applicable\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:02:58 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-A03 Add a “what happens during an incident” explanation: pause/blacklist/rate-limit actions, expected user impact, and how funds/LP positions are handled. Verify: runbook or FAQ reviewed by developer and linked from security docs. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-A03 Add a “what happens during an incident” explanation: pause/blacklist/rate\-limit actions, expected user impact, and how funds/LP positions are handled\. Verify: runbook or FAQ reviewed by developer and linked from security docs\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:06:20 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-A06 Add launch decision language: when to pause launch, when to launch with accepted risk, and when to block launch. Verify: checklist includes explicit go/no-go section signed off before production deploy. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-A06 Add launch decision language: when to pause launch, when to launch with accepted risk, and when to block launch\. Verify: checklist includes explicit go/no\-go section signed off before production deploy\.** as completed
PlasticDigits commented 2026-07-01 14:08:12 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in merge request !1004

mentioned in merge request !1004
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:10:38 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-A07 Create a concise security contact/escalation path for users reporting suspicious trades or UI states. Verify: visible docs issue/MR with contact path and expected response window. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-A07 Create a concise security contact/escalation path for users reporting suspicious trades or UI states\. Verify: visible docs issue/MR with contact path and expected response window\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:15:09 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop\. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:21:46 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs\. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:24:47 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy\. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled\-state tests match the documented policy\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:27:23 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B06 Verify wrap mapper pause blocks wrapping/unwrapping and produces clear UI copy. Verify: frontend unit tests and LocalTerra smoke test. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B06 Verify wrap mapper pause blocks wrapping/unwrapping and produces clear UI copy\. Verify: frontend unit tests and LocalTerra smoke test\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:47:19 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B09 Verify emergency controls are executable from the actual planned governance wallet/multisig, not just local test keys. Verify: testnet/local dry run using same signing flow or documented manual rehearsal. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B09 Verify emergency controls are executable from the actual planned governance wallet/multisig, not just local test keys\. Verify: testnet/local dry run using same signing flow or documented manual rehearsal\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:49:03 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B10 Document admin-key custody for small launch: multisig preferred, named backup signer, no single hot wallet for mainnet if avoidable. Verify: deployment runbook has signer list and rotation process. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B10 Document admin\-key custody for small launch: multisig preferred, named backup signer, no single hot wallet for mainnet if avoidable\. Verify: deployment runbook has signer list and rotation process\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 14:50:52 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B11 Add an emergency “pause/blacklist/unpause/unblacklist” command cookbook. Verify: commands are copy-pastable, parameterized, and rehearsed on LocalTerra. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B11 Add an emergency “pause/blacklist/unpause/unblacklist” command cookbook\. Verify: commands are copy\-pastable, parameterized, and rehearsed on LocalTerra\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 17:33:33 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-B12 Add explicit criteria for blacklisting during incidents: confirmed exploit signer, malicious token, compromised pair, and false-positive rollback. Verify: incident runbook has decision tree and rollback step. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-B12 Add explicit criteria for blacklisting during incidents: confirmed exploit signer, malicious token, compromised pair, and false\-positive rollback\. Verify: incident runbook has decision tree and rollback step\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 17:34:35 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C01 Verify constant-product swap accounting cannot return more value than reserves permit after fee/spread. Verify: unit/property tests for swap math, including edge reserves and tiny amounts. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C01 Verify constant\-product swap accounting cannot return more value than reserves permit after fee/spread\. Verify: unit/property tests for swap math, including edge reserves and tiny amounts\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 17:36:38 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C03 Verify commission/treasury transfer is atomic and pair does not retain fees unexpectedly. Verify: contract tests compare balances before/after successful and reverted swaps. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C03 Verify commission/treasury transfer is atomic and pair does not retain fees unexpectedly\. Verify: contract tests compare balances before/after successful and reverted swaps\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 17:40:34 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C04 Verify max_spread, min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C04 Verify max\_spread, min\_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths\. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-01 18:37:08 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in commit cf451ee207

mentioned in commit cf451ee207d1fa24116db3efcc987e364e1c2576
totdking commented 2026-07-01 18:45:59 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in merge request !1006

mentioned in merge request !1006
PlasticDigits commented 2026-07-02 02:00:53 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in commit 8162349bec

mentioned in commit 8162349bec873e4cced1efe950939bc341846fb8
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:07:13 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-C14 Verify contract migrations preserve all critical storage invariants: governance, treasury, pair registry, LP admin, blacklist, discounts, and limit books. Verify: migration tests from deployed versions to current version. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-C14 Verify contract migrations preserve all critical storage invariants: governance, treasury, pair registry, LP admin, blacklist, discounts, and limit books\. Verify: migration tests from deployed versions to current version\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:09:58 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D01 Create a historical exploit matrix with date, protocol, root cause, affected component, our equivalent surface, mitigation, and verification. Verify: committed docs table with links to tests/issues. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D01 Create a historical exploit matrix with date, protocol, root cause, affected component, our equivalent surface, mitigation, and verification\. Verify: committed docs table with links to tests/issues\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:11:09 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D02 Model Terra/Astroport IBC-hooks reentrancy/infinite-mint as a threat to bridged/CW20 assets and chain dependency patching. Verify: deployment runbook checks chain version/IBC-hooks exposure and records whether app contracts directly use IBC hooks. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D02 Model Terra/Astroport IBC\-hooks reentrancy/infinite\-mint as a threat to bridged/CW20 assets and chain dependency patching\. Verify: deployment runbook checks chain version/IBC\-hooks exposure and records whether app contracts directly use IBC hooks\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:15:27 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D10 Model admin-key compromise as the most realistic high-impact attack for small TVL. Verify: governance custody/runbook review and emergency rotation rehearsal. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D10 Model admin\-key compromise as the most realistic high\-impact attack for small TVL\. Verify: governance custody/runbook review and emergency rotation rehearsal\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:16:20 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D11 Model frontend wallet phishing/signing confusion. Verify: wallet signing UI clearly names action, pair, amount, max spread/min return, and chain; tests assert dangerous action labels. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D11 Model frontend wallet phishing/signing confusion\. Verify: wallet signing UI clearly names action, pair, amount, max spread/min return, and chain; tests assert dangerous action labels\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:21:24 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-D12 Model stale deployment artifact or missed security patch like Terra’s missed IBC patch. Verify: deploy runbook records git SHA, contract code IDs, chain versions, and post-deploy verification commands. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-D12 Model stale deployment artifact or missed security patch like Terra’s missed IBC patch\. Verify: deploy runbook records git SHA, contract code IDs, chain versions, and post\-deploy verification commands\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:22:44 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E01 Verify dApp disables swap/provide/withdraw/limit actions when blacklist check blocks wallet/token/pair. Verify: frontend tests across Swap, Pool, Trade, Limits/Portfolio paths. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E01 Verify dApp disables swap/provide/withdraw/limit actions when blacklist check blocks wallet/token/pair\. Verify: frontend tests across Swap, Pool, Trade, Limits/Portfolio paths\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:23:37 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E04 Verify rate-limit responses show calm retry guidance, not generic broken-app errors. Verify: frontend tests mock 429 and assert displayed message. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E04 Verify rate\-limit responses show calm retry guidance, not generic broken\-app errors\. Verify: frontend tests mock 429 and assert displayed message\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:25:26 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E05 Verify indexer outage and LCD 502 states distinguish “data unavailable” from “funds at risk.” Verify: tests for API error mapping and visible copy. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E05 Verify indexer outage and LCD 502 states distinguish “data unavailable” from “funds at risk\.” Verify: tests for API error mapping and visible copy\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:28:07 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E07 Verify route display aligns with actual submit operations and does not show duplicate/conflicting routes. Verify: route display tests and LocalTerra swap trace. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E07 Verify route display aligns with actual submit operations and does not show duplicate/conflicting routes\. Verify: route display tests and LocalTerra swap trace\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:30:46 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E08 Verify wallet signing fee guard prevents known Terra Station/LocalTerra stale-fee confusion where applicable. Verify: existing fee guard tests and manual wallet QA notes. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E08 Verify wallet signing fee guard prevents known Terra Station/LocalTerra stale\-fee confusion where applicable\. Verify: existing fee guard tests and manual wallet QA notes\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:33:10 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-E10 Verify external links/explorer links are sanitized and cannot inject script or misleading URLs. Verify: unit tests for explorer URL builder and link rendering. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-E10 Verify external links/explorer links are sanitized and cannot inject script or misleading URLs\. Verify: unit tests for explorer URL builder and link rendering\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:35:57 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F05 Verify query caps lower-bound and upper-bound every list/depth/limit route. Verify: integration tests cover negative, zero, huge, and valid values. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F05 Verify query caps lower\-bound and upper\-bound every list/depth/limit route\. Verify: integration tests cover negative, zero, huge, and valid values\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:39:50 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F12 Verify CSV export cannot produce formula injection surprises for common spreadsheet clients. Verify: review/export tests or documented risk acceptance if all exported fields are controlled numeric/address/hash values. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F12 Verify CSV export cannot produce formula injection surprises for common spreadsheet clients\. Verify: review/export tests or documented risk acceptance if all exported fields are controlled numeric/address/hash values\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 09:40:41 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-F13 Verify logs avoid private keys, mnemonics, bearer tokens, database URLs, and raw user secrets. Verify: grep/static review and test fixtures where feasible. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-F13 Verify logs avoid private keys, mnemonics, bearer tokens, database URLs, and raw user secrets\. Verify: grep/static review and test fixtures where feasible\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 11:42:24 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G01 Define minimum launch monitoring: contract error spikes, indexer lag, API 429/5xx, large swaps, large LP withdraws, blacklist hits, pause state changes. Verify: runbook lists commands/dashboards/log queries. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G01 Define minimum launch monitoring: contract error spikes, indexer lag, API 429/5xx, large swaps, large LP withdraws, blacklist hits, pause state changes\. Verify: runbook lists commands/dashboards/log queries\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 11:42:27 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G02 Add a simple anomaly checklist for small TVL: single wallet drains >X% pool, repeated add/remove profit loops, sudden route slippage, many failed txs, LCD-heavy route flood. Verify: incident runbook includes thresholds and response actions. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G02 Add a simple anomaly checklist for small TVL: single wallet drains \>X% pool, repeated add/remove profit loops, sudden route slippage, many failed txs, LCD\-heavy route flood\. Verify: incident runbook includes thresholds and response actions\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 11:42:29 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G03 Verify admin can identify top pools by TVL/liquidity quickly during incident. Verify: command/query in runbook returns pairs sorted by approximate value or quote liquidity. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G03 Verify admin can identify top pools by TVL/liquidity quickly during incident\. Verify: command/query in runbook returns pairs sorted by approximate value or quote liquidity\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 11:59:46 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G04 Verify admin can identify suspicious wallet/pair/token quickly. Verify: indexer/API queries or SQL snippets in runbook. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G04 Verify admin can identify suspicious wallet/pair/token quickly\. Verify: indexer/API queries or SQL snippets in runbook\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 12:38:56 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G05 Verify emergency communications template exists for pause, blacklist, exploit investigation, false alarm, and postmortem. Verify: docs include templates ready to paste. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G05 Verify emergency communications template exists for pause, blacklist, exploit investigation, false alarm, and postmortem\. Verify: docs include templates ready to paste\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 12:42:48 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G06 Verify incident timeline template captures time, tx hash, wallet, token, pair, admin action, and user impact. Verify: runbook includes blank template. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G06 Verify incident timeline template captures time, tx hash, wallet, token, pair, admin action, and user impact\. Verify: runbook includes blank template\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 15:45:32 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-G07 Verify restore procedure requires root cause or explicit risk acceptance before unpause/unblacklist. Verify: runbook has restore checklist. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-G07 Verify restore procedure requires root cause or explicit risk acceptance before unpause/unblacklist\. Verify: runbook has restore checklist\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 15:48:22 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H03 Verify post-deploy contract queries match expected config: governance, treasury, default fee, whitelisted CW20 code IDs, trusted routers, hooks, blacklist empty/default. Verify: scripted query output attached to release issue. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H03 Verify post\-deploy contract queries match expected config: governance, treasury, default fee, whitelisted CW20 code IDs, trusted routers, hooks, blacklist empty/default\. Verify: scripted query output attached to release issue\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 15:48:53 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H04 Verify frontend .env and indexer .env addresses match deployed contracts exactly. Verify: post-deploy script compares env files against chain query output. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H04 Verify frontend \.env and indexer \.env addresses match deployed contracts exactly\. Verify: post\-deploy script compares env files against chain query output\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 15:51:24 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H05 Verify migrations are rehearsed from previous deployed code IDs and rollback limitations are documented. Verify: migration test output and runbook note. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H05 Verify migrations are rehearsed from previous deployed code IDs and rollback limitations are documented\. Verify: migration test output and runbook note\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 15:51:26 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H08 Verify release checklist requires tests before deploy: contracts, indexer lib/integration as applicable, frontend unit tests, and at least one LocalTerra swap/limit smoke. Verify: release issue has pasted commands and results. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H08 Verify release checklist requires tests before deploy: contracts, indexer lib/integration as applicable, frontend unit tests, and at least one LocalTerra swap/limit smoke\. Verify: release issue has pasted commands and results\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 15:51:28 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-H09 Verify rollback/forward-fix decision tree for frontend-only issue, indexer issue, contract issue, and chain dependency issue. Verify: runbook section reviewed. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-H09 Verify rollback/forward\-fix decision tree for frontend\-only issue, indexer issue, contract issue, and chain dependency issue\. Verify: runbook section reviewed\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:06 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I02 Convert plausible LLM-generated exploit hypotheses into regression tests or explicit risk acceptances. Verify: each accepted hypothesis maps to test, issue, or documented non-applicability. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I02 Convert plausible LLM\-generated exploit hypotheses into regression tests or explicit risk acceptances\. Verify: each accepted hypothesis maps to test, issue, or documented non\-applicability\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:09 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I03 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on admin controls, blacklist/pause coverage, and obvious value-flow bugs. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I03 Run an agent\-assisted review focused only on admin controls, blacklist/pause coverage, and obvious value\-flow bugs\. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:11 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I04 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I04 Run an agent\-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity\. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:12 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I04 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as incomplete

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I04 Run an agent\-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity\. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged\.** as incomplete
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:12 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I05 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on frontend signing/risk communication. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I05 Run an agent\-assisted review focused only on frontend signing/risk communication\. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:16 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I06 Verify LLM-generated exploit scripts cannot overwhelm LocalTerra/API without hitting rate limits or documented local-only limits. Verify: controlled local load test evidence and 429 behavior. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I06 Verify LLM\-generated exploit scripts cannot overwhelm LocalTerra/API without hitting rate limits or documented local\-only limits\. Verify: controlled local load test evidence and 429 behavior\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:18 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I04 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I04 Run an agent\-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity\. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-02 16:04:20 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-I07 Keep the prompt pack and exploit matrix updated after each security incident or major feature. Verify: checklist item added to release process. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-I07 Keep the prompt pack and exploit matrix updated after each security incident or major feature\. Verify: checklist item added to release process\.** as completed
totdking commented 2026-07-03 09:12:25 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

marked the checklist item SEC-J05 Require prelaunch signoff from developer on P0 category completion and residual risks. Verify: final issue comment summarizes pass/fail and open risks. as completed

marked the checklist item **SEC\-J05 Require prelaunch signoff from developer on P0 category completion and residual risks\. Verify: final issue comment summarizes pass/fail and open risks\.** as completed
PlasticDigits (Migrated from gitlab.com) closed this issue 2026-07-07 02:10:20 +00:00
PlasticDigits commented 2026-07-07 02:21:42 +00:00 (Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in merge request !1010

mentioned in merge request !1010
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