Security hardening checklist for small-TVL launch #381
Labels
No labels
agent:fix_bugfix
agent:fix_conflicts
agent:fix_security
agent:gap_analysis
agent:implement
agent:implement
agent:implement
agent:open_issues
agent:ready
agent:research
agent:security_audit
agent:verify
architecture
backend
blocker:hybrid
blocker:launch
blocker:limit-orders
blocker:v2
block:log_only
block:security
bug
ci
contracts
correctness
deploy
dev
devops
docs
documentation
duplicate
e2e
enhancement
epic
feature
frontend
functional-completion
gas
good first issue
governance
help wanted
high-risk
hooks
hybrid
indexer
infra
infrastructure
integrators
invalid
launch-blocker
limit-orders
localnet
localterra
low priority
missing-implementation
needs-design
ops
performance
priority
high
priority
medium
product
qa
QA
question
ready
ready
research
scripts
security
security-hardening
smartcontracts
tech-debt
testing
ux
UX
v2
verification
wontfix
No milestone
No project
No assignees
1 participant
Notifications
Due date
No due date set.
Dependencies
No dependencies set.
Reference
code/cl8y-dex-terraclassic#381
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue
No description provided.
Delete branch "%!s()"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Context and Target Posture
Assumptions: projected launch is < $100k TVL and < 100 users. Security should focus on high-value, low-complexity defenses that reduce obvious loss, improve incident communication, and make historical exploit replay harder. We should assume attackers will use LLM agents and historical hack data to generate tests, prompts, fuzz cases, and exploit scripts against this repo.
Non-goal: defending against highly resourced/sophisticated attackers with bespoke zero-days. Goal: avoid preventable loss, user confusion, admin-key mistakes, known CosmWasm/Cosmos-stack exploit classes, and weak incident response.
Relevant historical themes to model: Terra/Astroport IBC-hooks reentrancy/infinite-mint exposure, Osmosis pool-share accounting bug, Levana oracle/update-timing manipulation, malicious token/contract registration, admin-key compromise, frontend wallet/signing confusion, indexer/API amplification, SQL/query injection, event spoofing, stale deployment/runbook drift.
Definition of Done
Each checked item must include evidence in an MR, issue comment, test output, runbook link, or explicit risk acceptance. Prefer automated tests where feasible; use manual runbook verification only when automation has poor ROI for the current TVL/user count.
SEC-A: Risk Scope and User Communication
SEC-B: Admin Controls, Governance, and Emergency Authority
UpdateConfig. Verify: existing #277 invariant tests plus docs/runbook step.SEC-C: Smart Contract Value-Flow Invariants
max_spread,min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants.AssetInfo::NativeTokenwhere documented.traderspoofing and trusted router success.SEC-D: Historical Cosmos/CosmWasm Exploit Replay Matrix
_contract_addressscoping and factory provenance reject clone/fake pair events.SEC-E: Frontend, Wallet, and User-Safety UX
SEC-F: Indexer, API, and Data Integrity
RUN_MODE=prod. Verify: indexer tests and startup log check.API_IPV6_ENABLED.FACTORY_ADDRESSrequired.SEC-G: Monitoring, Detection, and Incident Response
SEC-H: Deployment and Release Runbooks
.envand indexer.envaddresses match deployed contracts exactly. Verify: post-deploy script compares env files against chain query output.cargo audit/Rust review where practical, npm audit triage for high/critical runtime deps, no broad yak-shave for dev-only noise. Verify: audit output or risk-accepted notes.SEC-I: LLM-Agent Adversary Testing
SEC-J: Prioritization for < $100k TVL
assigned to @totdking
marked the checklist item SEC-A04 Document that factory trading blacklist is different from fee-discount tier 255. Verify: docs mention tier 255 does not halt trading and tests cover actual blacklist behavior. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-A05 Document user recovery paths after unpause/unblacklist, including LP withdraw, limit cancel/claim, and swap retry. Verify: LocalTerra or cw-multi-test evidence shows recovery after control removal. as completed
A: Risk Scope and User Communication
marked the checklist item SEC-B01 Verify governance-only access for blacklist wallet/token/pair operations. Verify: contract tests fail for non-governance callers and pass for governance. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B03 Verify token blacklist blocks both directions for every pair containing the token. Verify: tests cover offer-token and ask-token directions. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update. as incomplete
marked the checklist item SEC-B08 Verify LP admin rotation is bounded/paginated and cannot fan out unbounded during UpdateConfig. Verify: existing #277 invariant tests plus docs/runbook step. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution. as incomplete
marked the checklist item SEC-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair. as incomplete
marked the checklist item SEC-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy. as incomplete
marked the checklist item SEC-B07 Verify governance can rotate treasury, default fee, pair fee, hooks, trusted routers, and discount registry only through intended paths. Verify: contract auth matrix tests and docs update. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C02 Verify provide/withdraw liquidity share accounting cannot mint excess LP shares like the Osmosis pool-share exploit class. Verify: tests cover add/remove round trips, asymmetric deposits, initial liquidity, and repeated exploit-style cycles. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C04 Verify max_spread, min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C05 Verify native-token rejection remains enforced until native/wrap support is intentionally enabled. Verify: contract tests reject AssetInfo::NativeToken where documented. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C06 Verify CW20 code ID whitelist blocks malicious/unapproved token contracts from pair creation. Verify: create-pair tests include unwhitelisted CW20 and approved CW20. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C08 Verify hooks are governance-only, bounded/trusted, and hook revert behavior is intentional. Verify: tests cover non-governance hook registration rejection and hook revert causing swap failure. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C09 Verify router trusted-trader field cannot steal another wallet’s fee discount. Verify: tests cover untrusted router trader spoofing and trusted router success. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C10 Verify fee-discount EOA-only self-registration and governance-only Tier 0 / Tier 255 behavior. Verify: tests cover contract self-registration rejection and governance registration. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C11 Verify lazy deregistration on insufficient CL8Y balance never grants stale discount for the current swap. Verify: tests assert discount bps is zero once balance falls below tier. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C12 Verify limit order escrow cannot be stolen or stranded by fill/cancel/claim paths. Verify: tests cover partial fill, full fill, cancel, expiry park, claim refund, and pause/blacklist interactions. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C13 Verify hybrid swap consumes bounded maker fills and cannot exceed configured scan/fill budgets. Verify: tests cover max maker fills, expired head orders, and skipped overflow behavior. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C15 Verify no unbounded iteration is reachable by public users on hot paths. Verify: gas-focused tests or code review notes for factory, pair, router, and limit book paths. as completed
SEC-B: Admin Controls, Governance, and Emergency Authority
marked the checklist item SEC-C07 Verify pair-creation fee and one-create-per-block gate reduce spam/griefing and are documented. Verify: tests cover no fee, wrong denom, overpay refund, same-block second create, and governance fee update. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C04 Verify max_spread, min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants. as incomplete
SEC-C : Smart Contract Value-Flow Invariants
SEC-D: Historical Cosmos/CosmWasm Exploit Replay Matrix
marked the checklist item SEC-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable. as incomplete
marked the checklist item SEC-D04 Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. Verify: exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D03 Verify our contracts do not expose IBC receive/ack/timeout callbacks or recursive submessage entry points that resemble the IBC-hooks exploit path. Verify: code review checklist plus negative tests where applicable. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D04 Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. Verify: exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance. as incomplete
marked the checklist item SEC-D05 Model Levana oracle/update-timing manipulation as route/quote/stale-price risk even if not using external oracle for settlement. Verify: route/slippage tests and docs clarify quotes are advisory until on-chain execution. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D04 Model Osmosis LP-share accounting bug as repeated add/remove liquidity profit extraction. Verify: exploit-style regression test shows no profitable loop beyond rounding tolerance. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D06 Model malicious CW20 token behavior: transfer failure, fee-on-transfer, rebase-like balance changes, callback griefing. Verify: tests or documented risk acceptance for whitelist-only token admission. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D07 Model fake pair/fake event emission against the indexer. Verify: tests prove _contract_address scoping and factory provenance reject clone/fake pair events. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D08 Model SQL/query injection against public API sort, interval, ticker, pair, and CSV/export routes. Verify: indexer security tests cover malicious strings and return 400/404 without raw SQL errors. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D09 Model LCD amplification by LLM agents crawling orderbooks/routes. Verify: rate-limit tests, LCD query-budget tests, and cache tests on heavy routes. as completed
mentioned in merge request !935
mentioned in issue #337
marked the checklist item SEC-E02 Verify pair pause banner is visible and action-specific copy is clear. Verify: frontend tests assert banner and disabled actions. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E03 Verify wrap pause state disables wrapping with clear copy. Verify: frontend unit test plus LocalTerra smoke test. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E06 Verify extreme slippage blocks retail submit unless Expert Mode is explicitly enabled. Verify: tests for >30% and ≥99% slippage behavior. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E09 Verify risk acknowledgement modal/copy is shown for launch-risk areas without becoming click-through noise. Verify: UX review and tests for persistence/reset behavior. as completed
SEC-E: Frontend, Wallet, and User-Safety UX
SEC-F : Indexer, API, and Data Integrity
marked the checklist item SEC-F01 Verify production API rate limits are nonzero by default and cannot be disabled accidentally under RUN_MODE=prod. Verify: indexer tests and startup log check. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F02 Verify LCD-heavy routes have stricter limits than ordinary read routes. Verify: tests show heavy-route 429 under configured threshold. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F03 Verify API uses socket peer IP only unless a trusted proxy design is implemented. Verify: tests/config docs reject spoofable forwarded-header extraction. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F04 Verify IPv4-only default or documented IPv6 anti-abuse strategy. Verify: config tests and deployment runbook mention API_IPV6_ENABLED. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F06 Verify internal DB/LCD errors are sanitized and do not leak SQL, URLs, stack traces, or secrets. Verify: security tests assert generic 500/502 bodies. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F07 Verify CORS allowlist is explicit for production and dev. Verify: tests for allowed/disallowed origins and deploy env review. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F08 Verify block ingest fails safe on bad timestamps, pagination gaps, DB errors, and reorg hash mismatch. Verify: indexer ingestion hardening tests and reorg runbook. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F09 Verify swap/fill/lifecycle dedup prevents replay/double counting. Verify: unique indexes plus replay tests. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F10 Verify hybrid volume reconciliation cannot double-count maker fills as headline volume. Verify: indexer tests for pool/book leg sums and API aggregate totals. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F11 Verify factory pair provenance prevents fake pair indexing. Verify: malicious clone tests and production FACTORY_ADDRESS required. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G08 Verify no reliance on chain halt as the primary dApp incident control. Verify: runbook prioritizes app-level pause/blacklist/rate-limit before external validator coordination. as completed
SEC-G: Monitoring, Detection, and Incident Response
marked the checklist item SEC-H01 Write production deploy runbook with prerequisites, git SHA, contract artifacts, code IDs, addresses, governance/treasury, env vars, and rollback notes. Verify: runbook can be followed by another developer on LocalTerra/testnet. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H02 Verify LocalTerra deploy exercises real pair-creation fee and admin controls. Verify: deploy transcript or automated check references created pair, fee, pause, blacklist, unpause. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H06 Verify secrets are not committed and CI/CD variables are scoped. Verify: secret scan/grep and GitLab variable review. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H07 Verify dependency audit is proportionate: cargo audit/Rust review where practical, npm audit triage for high/critical runtime deps, no broad yak-shave for dev-only noise. Verify: audit output or risk-accepted notes. as completed
SEC-H: Deployment and Release Runbooks
marked the checklist item SEC-I01 Build an “LLM attacker prompt pack” from historical incidents and ask agents to generate exploit hypotheses against this repo. Verify: saved prompts/results and triaged findings. as completed
SEC-I: LLM-Agent Adversary Testing
mentioned in issue #464
mentioned in issue #465
mentioned in issue #466
mentioned in issue #468
mentioned in issue #470
mentioned in issue #471
mentioned in issue #467
mentioned in issue #469
marked the checklist item SEC-J01 Mark P0 launch blockers: admin controls broken, value-flow invariant failing, deploy/runbook missing, or user cannot see pause/blacklist/rate-limit risk. Verify: issue labels/priorities reflect blockers. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-J02 Mark P1 must-fix-before-growth: formal audit prep, broader fuzzing, richer monitoring, bounty policy, multisig hardening. Verify: follow-up issues exist but do not block small launch unless P0 evidence appears. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-J03 Mark accepted low-ROI items: expensive formal verification, complex oracle defenses not used in settlement, enterprise SOC workflows, advanced bot mitigation. Verify: documented risk acceptance with revisit threshold. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-J04 Define TVL/user thresholds that upgrade the security posture: e.g. $100k, $250k, $1M TVL or >100 active users. Verify: docs list required actions per threshold. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-A01 Define the public security posture for small-TVL launch: capped expectations, unaudited/limited-audit language, admin controls, and known residual risks. Verify: docs page or launch notice exists and is linked from the dApp/footer. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-A02 Write user-facing copy for trading blacklist, pair pause, wrap pause, rate limit, indexer outage, and excessive slippage states. Verify: frontend tests assert clear messages and disabled CTAs where applicable. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-A03 Add a “what happens during an incident” explanation: pause/blacklist/rate-limit actions, expected user impact, and how funds/LP positions are handled. Verify: runbook or FAQ reviewed by developer and linked from security docs. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-A06 Add launch decision language: when to pause launch, when to launch with accepted risk, and when to block launch. Verify: checklist includes explicit go/no-go section signed off before production deploy. as completed
mentioned in merge request !1004
marked the checklist item SEC-A07 Create a concise security contact/escalation path for users reporting suspicious trades or UI states. Verify: visible docs issue/MR with contact path and expected response window. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B02 Verify wallet blacklist blocks swaps, hybrid swaps, provide liquidity, withdraw liquidity, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and router multihop. Verify: contract tests cover every execute path and unblacklist restores normal execution. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B04 Verify pair blacklist blocks all user actions on that pair without affecting unrelated pairs. Verify: tests include blocked target pair and unaffected control pair. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B05 Verify pair pause blocks swap, hybrid swap, limit place/cancel/claim/update, and LP actions according to intended policy. Verify: contract tests and frontend disabled-state tests match the documented policy. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B06 Verify wrap mapper pause blocks wrapping/unwrapping and produces clear UI copy. Verify: frontend unit tests and LocalTerra smoke test. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B09 Verify emergency controls are executable from the actual planned governance wallet/multisig, not just local test keys. Verify: testnet/local dry run using same signing flow or documented manual rehearsal. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B10 Document admin-key custody for small launch: multisig preferred, named backup signer, no single hot wallet for mainnet if avoidable. Verify: deployment runbook has signer list and rotation process. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B11 Add an emergency “pause/blacklist/unpause/unblacklist” command cookbook. Verify: commands are copy-pastable, parameterized, and rehearsed on LocalTerra. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-B12 Add explicit criteria for blacklisting during incidents: confirmed exploit signer, malicious token, compromised pair, and false-positive rollback. Verify: incident runbook has decision tree and rollback step. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C01 Verify constant-product swap accounting cannot return more value than reserves permit after fee/spread. Verify: unit/property tests for swap math, including edge reserves and tiny amounts. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C03 Verify commission/treasury transfer is atomic and pair does not retain fees unexpectedly. Verify: contract tests compare balances before/after successful and reverted swaps. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-C04 Verify max_spread, min_return, and deadline enforcement cannot be bypassed through router or hybrid paths. Verify: tests cover direct pair, router, and hybrid swap variants. as completed
mentioned in commit
cf451ee207mentioned in merge request !1006
mentioned in commit
8162349becmarked the checklist item SEC-C14 Verify contract migrations preserve all critical storage invariants: governance, treasury, pair registry, LP admin, blacklist, discounts, and limit books. Verify: migration tests from deployed versions to current version. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D01 Create a historical exploit matrix with date, protocol, root cause, affected component, our equivalent surface, mitigation, and verification. Verify: committed docs table with links to tests/issues. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D02 Model Terra/Astroport IBC-hooks reentrancy/infinite-mint as a threat to bridged/CW20 assets and chain dependency patching. Verify: deployment runbook checks chain version/IBC-hooks exposure and records whether app contracts directly use IBC hooks. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D10 Model admin-key compromise as the most realistic high-impact attack for small TVL. Verify: governance custody/runbook review and emergency rotation rehearsal. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D11 Model frontend wallet phishing/signing confusion. Verify: wallet signing UI clearly names action, pair, amount, max spread/min return, and chain; tests assert dangerous action labels. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-D12 Model stale deployment artifact or missed security patch like Terra’s missed IBC patch. Verify: deploy runbook records git SHA, contract code IDs, chain versions, and post-deploy verification commands. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E01 Verify dApp disables swap/provide/withdraw/limit actions when blacklist check blocks wallet/token/pair. Verify: frontend tests across Swap, Pool, Trade, Limits/Portfolio paths. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E04 Verify rate-limit responses show calm retry guidance, not generic broken-app errors. Verify: frontend tests mock 429 and assert displayed message. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E05 Verify indexer outage and LCD 502 states distinguish “data unavailable” from “funds at risk.” Verify: tests for API error mapping and visible copy. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E07 Verify route display aligns with actual submit operations and does not show duplicate/conflicting routes. Verify: route display tests and LocalTerra swap trace. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E08 Verify wallet signing fee guard prevents known Terra Station/LocalTerra stale-fee confusion where applicable. Verify: existing fee guard tests and manual wallet QA notes. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-E10 Verify external links/explorer links are sanitized and cannot inject script or misleading URLs. Verify: unit tests for explorer URL builder and link rendering. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F05 Verify query caps lower-bound and upper-bound every list/depth/limit route. Verify: integration tests cover negative, zero, huge, and valid values. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F12 Verify CSV export cannot produce formula injection surprises for common spreadsheet clients. Verify: review/export tests or documented risk acceptance if all exported fields are controlled numeric/address/hash values. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-F13 Verify logs avoid private keys, mnemonics, bearer tokens, database URLs, and raw user secrets. Verify: grep/static review and test fixtures where feasible. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G01 Define minimum launch monitoring: contract error spikes, indexer lag, API 429/5xx, large swaps, large LP withdraws, blacklist hits, pause state changes. Verify: runbook lists commands/dashboards/log queries. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G02 Add a simple anomaly checklist for small TVL: single wallet drains >X% pool, repeated add/remove profit loops, sudden route slippage, many failed txs, LCD-heavy route flood. Verify: incident runbook includes thresholds and response actions. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G03 Verify admin can identify top pools by TVL/liquidity quickly during incident. Verify: command/query in runbook returns pairs sorted by approximate value or quote liquidity. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G04 Verify admin can identify suspicious wallet/pair/token quickly. Verify: indexer/API queries or SQL snippets in runbook. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G05 Verify emergency communications template exists for pause, blacklist, exploit investigation, false alarm, and postmortem. Verify: docs include templates ready to paste. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G06 Verify incident timeline template captures time, tx hash, wallet, token, pair, admin action, and user impact. Verify: runbook includes blank template. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-G07 Verify restore procedure requires root cause or explicit risk acceptance before unpause/unblacklist. Verify: runbook has restore checklist. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H03 Verify post-deploy contract queries match expected config: governance, treasury, default fee, whitelisted CW20 code IDs, trusted routers, hooks, blacklist empty/default. Verify: scripted query output attached to release issue. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H04 Verify frontend .env and indexer .env addresses match deployed contracts exactly. Verify: post-deploy script compares env files against chain query output. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H05 Verify migrations are rehearsed from previous deployed code IDs and rollback limitations are documented. Verify: migration test output and runbook note. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H08 Verify release checklist requires tests before deploy: contracts, indexer lib/integration as applicable, frontend unit tests, and at least one LocalTerra swap/limit smoke. Verify: release issue has pasted commands and results. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-H09 Verify rollback/forward-fix decision tree for frontend-only issue, indexer issue, contract issue, and chain dependency issue. Verify: runbook section reviewed. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-I02 Convert plausible LLM-generated exploit hypotheses into regression tests or explicit risk acceptances. Verify: each accepted hypothesis maps to test, issue, or documented non-applicability. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-I03 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on admin controls, blacklist/pause coverage, and obvious value-flow bugs. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-I04 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-I04 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as incomplete
marked the checklist item SEC-I05 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on frontend signing/risk communication. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-I06 Verify LLM-generated exploit scripts cannot overwhelm LocalTerra/API without hitting rate limits or documented local-only limits. Verify: controlled local load test evidence and 429 behavior. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-I04 Run an agent-assisted review focused only on indexer/API abuse and data integrity. Verify: review output linked and findings triaged. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-I07 Keep the prompt pack and exploit matrix updated after each security incident or major feature. Verify: checklist item added to release process. as completed
marked the checklist item SEC-J05 Require prelaunch signoff from developer on P0 category completion and residual risks. Verify: final issue comment summarizes pass/fail and open risks. as completed
mentioned in merge request !1010