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QA: live contract-state checklist — MegaETH mainnet (Arena v2, chain 4326) #357

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opened 2026-06-30 18:45:40 +00:00 by Brouie · 4 comments

Brouie commented

2026-06-30 18:45:40 +00:00

(Migrated from gitlab.com)

Read-only checklist for walking the live Arena v2 deploy on MegaETH mainnet (chainId 4326) and confirming the on-chain state matches what DeployProduction.s.sol + the production *.t.sol tests intend. Everything here is cast call / cast storage only -- no keys, no broadcasts. Tick a box when the on-chain value matches the expected; for the read-only ones, tick when you've eyeballed it and it's sane.

I scripted every line below into a one-shot sweep that prints PASS/FAIL/REVIEW + a summary, so this can run automated or get walked by hand. Ran it against the live deploy and got 77 PASS / 0 FAIL / 47 REVIEW -- all the deterministic wiring/config matched; the REVIEW lines are the non-deterministic ones (ownership/TWAP/balances/lifecycle).

How to run

export RPC=${RPC:-https://mainnet.megaeth.com/rpc}
cast chain-id --rpc-url $RPC        # expect 4326

Role hashes (constant on every AccessControl contract):

MINTER_ROLE = 0x9f2df0fed2c77648de5860a4cc508cd0818c85b8b8a1ab4ceeef8d981c8956a6
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
ERC-1967 impl slot = 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc (read with cast storage)

cast prints big uints with a scientific hint (86400 [8.64e4]) -- the leading integer is the real value. Addresses come back checksummed, compare case-insensitive. A revert or RPC error means the call failed -- treat that as a red flag, not a pass.

Registry under test

indexer/address-registry.megaeth-mainnet.json (gitCommit 99e3478b, deployBlock 19853582)

name	address
Doubloon (DOUB, reused)	`0xc3654b4f879937b767afbb64b7c230ff436d2342`
CL8Y_reserve	`0xfBAa45A537cF07dC768c469FfaC4e88208B0098D`
PlayCred	`0x998fb7989425ed0c14545ce27a5cc3a9d9349ac1`
PodiumVaults	`0x7abb3c243a938d1b809b07b8b3f1d60044b46698`
ReferralRegistry	`0xc729ee049b18669e3c4ebfebcac676da7992a246`
TimeArena	`0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee`
TimeArenaBuyRouter	`0x3151c335224f5bbfde174b15dba9523a0694d582`
deployer	`0xd5f3eff25caa075f1f33dbf9ca6883c741d408a2`
admin (CL8Y manager)	`0xcd4eb82cfc16d5785b4f7e3bfc255e735e79f39c`
Kumbaya V3 router	`0xE5BbEF8De2DB447a7432A47EBa58924d94eE470e`
WETH	`0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000006`
USDm (stable)	`0xFAfDdbb3FC7688494971a79cc65DCa3EF82079E7`

Same DOUB must show up from TimeArena, PodiumVaults, ReferralRegistry and the BuyRouter -- both ends of each wiring pair are kept on purpose.

TimeArena -- `0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee`

UUPS proxy, Ownable2Step. All calls hit the proxy.

owner() -> admin 0xcd4e..f39c (deployer if handoff not yet accepted)
pendingOwner() -> 0x0 (nonzero = handoff started, not accepted)
doub() -> DOUB 0xc365..2342
podiumVaults() -> 0x7abb..6698 (cross-check vs PodiumVaults.arena())
referralRegistry() -> 0xc729..a246 (cross-check vs ReferralRegistry.timeArena())
playCred() -> 0x998f..9ac1 (cross-check vs PlayCred MINTER_ROLE grant)
timeArenaBuyRouter() -> 0x3151..d582
charmPriceWad() / epochCharmAnchorWad() / effectiveCharmPriceWad() -> all > 0 (TWAP-derived ~$1/CHARM)
charmAnchorKumbayaRouter() -> 0x0 (spot oracle stays unset on prod)
buyChargeIntervalSec() = 300, buyCooldownSec() = 300, maxBuyCharges() = 5, burstBuyCooldownSec() = 15
podiumTimerExtensionSec[0..3] -> 120, 60, 90, 300
podiumInitialTimerSec[0..3] -> 86400, 43200, 64800, 172800
podiumTimerCapSec[0..3] -> 345600, 172800, 259200, 691200
podiumResetBelowRemainingSec[0..3] -> 780, 240, 510, 3300
podiumResetToRemainingSec[0..3] -> 900, 300, 600, 3600
paused() -> false
lifecycle (read & eyeball): arenaStart() epochAnchorTimestamp() deadline() lastBuyEpoch() podiumTimerArmed[0..3] -- all 0/false on an un-started arena
impl slot nonzero: cast storage 0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc --rpc-url $RPC

PodiumVaults -- `0x7abb3c243a938d1b809b07b8b3f1d60044b46698`

Plain Ownable (no pendingOwner, not a proxy -- no impl slot). Pools commingled.

doub() -> DOUB 0xc365..2342
arena() -> TimeArena 0xba39..e0ee (cross-check vs TimeArena.podiumVaults())
owner() -> admin 0xcd4e..f39c (nonzero)
activePools/seedPools/futurePools[0..3] -> all == PodiumVaults self 0x7abb..6698 (commingled default)
activePoolBalance/seedPoolBalance/futurePoolBalance[0..3] -> read (0 until funded)

ReferralRegistry -- `0xc729ee049b18669e3c4ebfebcac676da7992a246`

UUPS proxy, Ownable2Step. doubToken()/registrationBurnAmount() route through the arena, so a clean return also proves the arena link is live.

timeArena() -> TimeArena 0xba39..e0ee
doubToken() and cl8yToken() (legacy alias) -> DOUB 0xc365..2342
registrationBurnAmount() -> > 0 (tracks charmPriceWad by design)
owner() -> admin 0xcd4e..f39c, pendingOwner() -> 0x0
BURN_ADDRESS() -> 0x..dEaD
impl slot nonzero (same slot const, via cast storage)

PlayCred -- `0x998fb7989425ed0c14545ce27a5cc3a9d9349ac1`

ERC20 + AccessControl. NOT a proxy (no impl slot), NOT Enumerable. Custody = whoever holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (no owner()).

hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, TimeArena) -> true (only the arena mints/burns CRED -- the core wiring proof)
hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, deployer) -> false (deployer renounced after handoff)
hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin 0xcd4e..f39c) -> true
getRoleAdmin(MINTER_ROLE) -> DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (0x000..0)
name() = "Play CRED", symbol() = "CRED", decimals() = 18
supportsInterface(0x7965db0b) -> true (AccessControl)
totalSupply() -> read (0 valid if arena hasn't minted CRED yet)

TimeArenaBuyRouter -- `0x3151c335224f5bbfde174b15dba9523a0694d582`

Plain Ownable2Step, not a proxy. The seven address/token fields are constructor immutables.

timeArena() -> TimeArena 0xba39..e0ee
kumbayaRouter() -> 0xE5Bb..470e
doub() -> DOUB, cl8y() -> 0xfBAa..098D, weth() -> 0x4200..0006, stableToken() -> USDm 0xFAfD..79E7
doubSurplusRecipient() -> nonzero (currently deployer 0xd5f3..08a2; fee sink, not a role)
owner() -> admin 0xcd4e..f39c, pendingOwner() -> 0x0
PAY_ETH / PAY_STABLE / PAY_CL8Y -> 0 / 1 / 2

Doubloon (DOUB) -- `0xc3654b4f879937b767afbb64b7c230ff436d2342`

ERC20Burnable + AccessControl. Reused launch token (not redeployed here) -- role holders belong to the original launcher, so the hasRole lines are read-and-report, not asserts.

name() = "Doubloon", symbol() = "DOUB", decimals() = 18
totalSupply() -> > 0 (pre-existing supply w/ Kumbaya liquidity)
MINTER_ROLE / DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE constants match (bytecode sanity)
hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, TimeArena) -> read (expected false -- arena spends/burns DOUB, doesn't mint it)
hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, deployer) / hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, deployer) -> read & report

What the last sweep showed

All wiring, config and ownership lined up -- 0 fails. Ownership is fully handed to the CL8Y manager 0xcd4e..f39c on every contract (pendingOwner cleared, PlayCred admin moved off the deployer; deployer key holds nothing but the buy-router surplus sink). Per-podium timers match the product table, charm price is TWAP-derived ~$1/CHARM.

One thing to call out: the arena is deployed + fully wired + ownership-secured but not started -- arenaStart, deadline, lastBuyEpoch all 0, podium timers unarmed, pools unfunded, CRED supply 0, not paused. Reads as intentional pre-launch; flagging so it's on record. Re-running the checklist after startArena() should flip the lifecycle lines and keep everything else green.

@PlasticDigits filing this as the live-contract-state verification record per your ask -- can confirm the not-started state is just pre-launch when you get a sec.

Read-only checklist for walking the live Arena v2 deploy on MegaETH mainnet (chainId 4326) and confirming the on-chain state matches what `DeployProduction.s.sol` + the production `*.t.sol` tests intend. Everything here is `cast call` / `cast storage` only -- no keys, no broadcasts. Tick a box when the on-chain value matches the expected; for the read-only ones, tick when you've eyeballed it and it's sane. I scripted every line below into a one-shot sweep that prints PASS/FAIL/REVIEW + a summary, so this can run automated or get walked by hand. Ran it against the live deploy and got **77 PASS / 0 FAIL / 47 REVIEW** -- all the deterministic wiring/config matched; the REVIEW lines are the non-deterministic ones (ownership/TWAP/balances/lifecycle). ## How to run ``` export RPC=${RPC:-https://mainnet.megaeth.com/rpc} cast chain-id --rpc-url $RPC # expect 4326 ``` Role hashes (constant on every AccessControl contract): - `MINTER_ROLE` = `0x9f2df0fed2c77648de5860a4cc508cd0818c85b8b8a1ab4ceeef8d981c8956a6` - `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` = `0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000` - ERC-1967 impl slot = `0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc` (read with `cast storage`) cast prints big uints with a scientific hint (`86400 [8.64e4]`) -- the leading integer is the real value. Addresses come back checksummed, compare case-insensitive. A revert or RPC error means the call failed -- treat that as a red flag, not a pass. ## Registry under test `indexer/address-registry.megaeth-mainnet.json` (gitCommit `99e3478b`, deployBlock 19853582) | name | address | |---|---| | Doubloon (DOUB, reused) | `0xc3654b4f879937b767afbb64b7c230ff436d2342` | | CL8Y_reserve | `0xfBAa45A537cF07dC768c469FfaC4e88208B0098D` | | PlayCred | `0x998fb7989425ed0c14545ce27a5cc3a9d9349ac1` | | PodiumVaults | `0x7abb3c243a938d1b809b07b8b3f1d60044b46698` | | ReferralRegistry | `0xc729ee049b18669e3c4ebfebcac676da7992a246` | | TimeArena | `0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee` | | TimeArenaBuyRouter | `0x3151c335224f5bbfde174b15dba9523a0694d582` | | deployer | `0xd5f3eff25caa075f1f33dbf9ca6883c741d408a2` | | admin (CL8Y manager) | `0xcd4eb82cfc16d5785b4f7e3bfc255e735e79f39c` | | Kumbaya V3 router | `0xE5BbEF8De2DB447a7432A47EBa58924d94eE470e` | | WETH | `0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000006` | | USDm (stable) | `0xFAfDdbb3FC7688494971a79cc65DCa3EF82079E7` | Same DOUB must show up from TimeArena, PodiumVaults, ReferralRegistry and the BuyRouter -- both ends of each wiring pair are kept on purpose. ## TimeArena -- `0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee` UUPS proxy, Ownable2Step. All calls hit the proxy. - [ ] `owner()` -> admin `0xcd4e..f39c` (deployer if handoff not yet accepted) - [ ] `pendingOwner()` -> `0x0` (nonzero = handoff started, not accepted) - [ ] `doub()` -> DOUB `0xc365..2342` - [ ] `podiumVaults()` -> `0x7abb..6698` (cross-check vs PodiumVaults.arena()) - [ ] `referralRegistry()` -> `0xc729..a246` (cross-check vs ReferralRegistry.timeArena()) - [ ] `playCred()` -> `0x998f..9ac1` (cross-check vs PlayCred MINTER_ROLE grant) - [ ] `timeArenaBuyRouter()` -> `0x3151..d582` - [ ] `charmPriceWad()` / `epochCharmAnchorWad()` / `effectiveCharmPriceWad()` -> all > 0 (TWAP-derived ~$1/CHARM) - [ ] `charmAnchorKumbayaRouter()` -> `0x0` (spot oracle stays unset on prod) - [ ] `buyChargeIntervalSec()` = 300, `buyCooldownSec()` = 300, `maxBuyCharges()` = 5, `burstBuyCooldownSec()` = 15 - [ ] `podiumTimerExtensionSec[0..3]` -> 120, 60, 90, 300 - [ ] `podiumInitialTimerSec[0..3]` -> 86400, 43200, 64800, 172800 - [ ] `podiumTimerCapSec[0..3]` -> 345600, 172800, 259200, 691200 - [ ] `podiumResetBelowRemainingSec[0..3]` -> 780, 240, 510, 3300 - [ ] `podiumResetToRemainingSec[0..3]` -> 900, 300, 600, 3600 - [ ] `paused()` -> false - [ ] lifecycle (read & eyeball): `arenaStart()` `epochAnchorTimestamp()` `deadline()` `lastBuyEpoch()` `podiumTimerArmed[0..3]` -- all 0/false on an un-started arena - [ ] impl slot nonzero: `cast storage 0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee 0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc --rpc-url $RPC` ## PodiumVaults -- `0x7abb3c243a938d1b809b07b8b3f1d60044b46698` Plain Ownable (no pendingOwner, not a proxy -- no impl slot). Pools commingled. - [ ] `doub()` -> DOUB `0xc365..2342` - [ ] `arena()` -> TimeArena `0xba39..e0ee` (cross-check vs TimeArena.podiumVaults()) - [ ] `owner()` -> admin `0xcd4e..f39c` (nonzero) - [ ] `activePools/seedPools/futurePools[0..3]` -> all == PodiumVaults self `0x7abb..6698` (commingled default) - [ ] `activePoolBalance/seedPoolBalance/futurePoolBalance[0..3]` -> read (0 until funded) ## ReferralRegistry -- `0xc729ee049b18669e3c4ebfebcac676da7992a246` UUPS proxy, Ownable2Step. doubToken()/registrationBurnAmount() route through the arena, so a clean return also proves the arena link is live. - [ ] `timeArena()` -> TimeArena `0xba39..e0ee` - [ ] `doubToken()` and `cl8yToken()` (legacy alias) -> DOUB `0xc365..2342` - [ ] `registrationBurnAmount()` -> > 0 (tracks charmPriceWad by design) - [ ] `owner()` -> admin `0xcd4e..f39c`, `pendingOwner()` -> `0x0` - [ ] `BURN_ADDRESS()` -> `0x..dEaD` - [ ] impl slot nonzero (same slot const, via `cast storage`) ## PlayCred -- `0x998fb7989425ed0c14545ce27a5cc3a9d9349ac1` ERC20 + AccessControl. NOT a proxy (no impl slot), NOT Enumerable. Custody = whoever holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (no owner()). - [ ] `hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, TimeArena)` -> true (only the arena mints/burns CRED -- the core wiring proof) - [ ] `hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, deployer)` -> false (deployer renounced after handoff) - [ ] `hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, admin 0xcd4e..f39c)` -> true - [ ] `getRoleAdmin(MINTER_ROLE)` -> DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (`0x000..0`) - [ ] `name()` = "Play CRED", `symbol()` = "CRED", `decimals()` = 18 - [ ] `supportsInterface(0x7965db0b)` -> true (AccessControl) - [ ] `totalSupply()` -> read (0 valid if arena hasn't minted CRED yet) ## TimeArenaBuyRouter -- `0x3151c335224f5bbfde174b15dba9523a0694d582` Plain Ownable2Step, not a proxy. The seven address/token fields are constructor immutables. - [ ] `timeArena()` -> TimeArena `0xba39..e0ee` - [ ] `kumbayaRouter()` -> `0xE5Bb..470e` - [ ] `doub()` -> DOUB, `cl8y()` -> `0xfBAa..098D`, `weth()` -> `0x4200..0006`, `stableToken()` -> USDm `0xFAfD..79E7` - [ ] `doubSurplusRecipient()` -> nonzero (currently deployer `0xd5f3..08a2`; fee sink, not a role) - [ ] `owner()` -> admin `0xcd4e..f39c`, `pendingOwner()` -> `0x0` - [ ] `PAY_ETH` / `PAY_STABLE` / `PAY_CL8Y` -> 0 / 1 / 2 ## Doubloon (DOUB) -- `0xc3654b4f879937b767afbb64b7c230ff436d2342` ERC20Burnable + AccessControl. Reused launch token (not redeployed here) -- role holders belong to the original launcher, so the hasRole lines are read-and-report, not asserts. - [ ] `name()` = "Doubloon", `symbol()` = "DOUB", `decimals()` = 18 - [ ] `totalSupply()` -> > 0 (pre-existing supply w/ Kumbaya liquidity) - [ ] `MINTER_ROLE` / `DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE` constants match (bytecode sanity) - [ ] `hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, TimeArena)` -> read (expected false -- arena spends/burns DOUB, doesn't mint it) - [ ] `hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, deployer)` / `hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, deployer)` -> read & report ## What the last sweep showed All wiring, config and ownership lined up -- 0 fails. Ownership is fully handed to the CL8Y manager `0xcd4e..f39c` on every contract (pendingOwner cleared, PlayCred admin moved off the deployer; deployer key holds nothing but the buy-router surplus sink). Per-podium timers match the product table, charm price is TWAP-derived ~$1/CHARM. One thing to call out: the arena is deployed + fully wired + ownership-secured but **not started** -- `arenaStart`, `deadline`, `lastBuyEpoch` all 0, podium timers unarmed, pools unfunded, CRED supply 0, not paused. Reads as intentional pre-launch; flagging so it's on record. Re-running the checklist after `startArena()` should flip the lifecycle lines and keep everything else green. @PlasticDigits filing this as the live-contract-state verification record per your ask -- can confirm the not-started state is just pre-launch when you get a sec.

Brouie commented

2026-06-30 18:51:20 +00:00

(Migrated from gitlab.com)

changed the description

Brouie commented

2026-06-30 19:07:19 +00:00

(Migrated from gitlab.com)

mentioned in issue #358

PlasticDigits commented

2026-06-30 22:32:15 +00:00

(Migrated from gitlab.com)

Should do as many checks as possible before start Arena is called (at scheduled time on yieldomega.com)
Handover should have occurred for owner, if not needs to be flagged

Should do as many checks as possible before start Arena is called (at scheduled time on yieldomega.com) Handover should have occurred for owner, if not needs to be flagged

Brouie commented

2026-07-01 06:45:23 +00:00

(Migrated from gitlab.com)

Re-swept the live 4326 state to answer both things you flagged.

Handover — done, and it's the finalized state, nothing to flag.
Ownership sits fully with the CL8Y manager 0xcd4e..f39c (the address documented in contracts/README.md) on every contract, and it's accepted, not a mid-flight transfer:

TimeArena / ReferralRegistry / PodiumVaults / TimeArenaBuyRouter owner() all = 0xcd4e..f39c
TimeArena + ReferralRegistry pendingOwner() = 0x0 -- the Ownable2Step acceptOwnership() has actually been called. The chain is a step past what DeployProductionOwnership.t.sol snapshots (that test asserts owner=deployer / pendingOwner=admin, i.e. handoff in flight). Live is one step further: finalized.
PlayCred: deployer no longer holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (false), manager holds it (true), TimeArena holds MINTER_ROLE (true)
deployer 0xd5f3..08a2 retains nothing but the buy-router DOUB surplus sink, which is a fee recipient, not a role

So the "if handover hasn't happened, flag it" branch doesn't trigger -- it's clean.

Pre-start checks -- everything runnable before startArena is green.
Full read-only sweep (cast only) against mainnet.megaeth.com/rpc at block 20089546: 77 PASS / 0 FAIL / 47 REVIEW, byte-identical to the baseline I filed at block 20046419 -- no drift across the ~43k blocks between. Arena is deployed, fully wired, ownership-secured, and still dormant:

arenaStart / deadline / lastBuyEpoch / epochAnchorTimestamp all 0, podium timers unarmed, not paused, CRED supply 0, pools unfunded
wiring agrees both ends (TimeArena<->PodiumVaults, TimeArena<->ReferralRegistry, DOUB identical from all four consumers); UUPS impl slots nonzero
config matches deploy intent: podium timer arrays [120/60/90/300], [86400/43200/64800/172800], the 4x caps, the reset arrays, buy config 300/300/5/15, PAY 0/1/2, charmAnchorKumbayaRouter unset
charm price is TWAP-derived (~4.83e22 DOUB-wei/CHARM, ~$1 by design), inside the enforced [1e18, 1e26] band

Didn't just trust my own sweep script -- cross-checked three ways: the script, a raw cast dump with no comparison logic in the path, and an independent re-derivation of the intended values straight from DeployProduction.s.sol + DeployProductionBuyRouter.s.sol + the three DeployProduction*.t.sol tests (48 invariants, all matched). All three agree.

What's left is inherently post-start: the lifecycle lines (arenaStart / deadline / timers / CRED supply) only flip once startArena fires from the site. When you kick that off at the scheduled time, ping me and I'll re-run the sweep to confirm those flip correctly and everything else holds. @PlasticDigits

Everything verifiable pre-launch is verified on my side.

Re-swept the live 4326 state to answer both things you flagged. **Handover — done, and it's the finalized state, nothing to flag.** Ownership sits fully with the CL8Y manager `0xcd4e..f39c` (the address documented in contracts/README.md) on every contract, and it's accepted, not a mid-flight transfer: - TimeArena / ReferralRegistry / PodiumVaults / TimeArenaBuyRouter `owner()` all = `0xcd4e..f39c` - TimeArena + ReferralRegistry `pendingOwner()` = `0x0` -- the Ownable2Step `acceptOwnership()` has actually been called. The chain is a step past what DeployProductionOwnership.t.sol snapshots (that test asserts owner=deployer / pendingOwner=admin, i.e. handoff in flight). Live is one step further: finalized. - PlayCred: deployer no longer holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (false), manager holds it (true), TimeArena holds MINTER_ROLE (true) - deployer `0xd5f3..08a2` retains nothing but the buy-router DOUB surplus sink, which is a fee recipient, not a role So the "if handover hasn't happened, flag it" branch doesn't trigger -- it's clean. **Pre-start checks -- everything runnable before startArena is green.** Full read-only sweep (cast only) against mainnet.megaeth.com/rpc at block 20089546: 77 PASS / 0 FAIL / 47 REVIEW, byte-identical to the baseline I filed at block 20046419 -- no drift across the ~43k blocks between. Arena is deployed, fully wired, ownership-secured, and still dormant: - arenaStart / deadline / lastBuyEpoch / epochAnchorTimestamp all 0, podium timers unarmed, not paused, CRED supply 0, pools unfunded - wiring agrees both ends (TimeArena<->PodiumVaults, TimeArena<->ReferralRegistry, DOUB identical from all four consumers); UUPS impl slots nonzero - config matches deploy intent: podium timer arrays [120/60/90/300], [86400/43200/64800/172800], the 4x caps, the reset arrays, buy config 300/300/5/15, PAY 0/1/2, charmAnchorKumbayaRouter unset - charm price is TWAP-derived (~4.83e22 DOUB-wei/CHARM, ~$1 by design), inside the enforced [1e18, 1e26] band Didn't just trust my own sweep script -- cross-checked three ways: the script, a raw cast dump with no comparison logic in the path, and an independent re-derivation of the intended values straight from DeployProduction.s.sol + DeployProductionBuyRouter.s.sol + the three DeployProduction*.t.sol tests (48 invariants, all matched). All three agree. **What's left is inherently post-start:** the lifecycle lines (arenaStart / deadline / timers / CRED supply) only flip once startArena fires from the site. When you kick that off at the scheduled time, ping me and I'll re-run the sweep to confirm those flip correctly and everything else holds. @PlasticDigits Everything verifiable pre-launch is verified on my side.

PlasticDigits (Migrated from gitlab.com) closed this issue

2026-07-07 03:54:31 +00:00

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QA: live contract-state checklist — MegaETH mainnet (Arena v2, chain 4326) #357

How to run

Registry under test

TimeArena -- 0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee

PodiumVaults -- 0x7abb3c243a938d1b809b07b8b3f1d60044b46698

ReferralRegistry -- 0xc729ee049b18669e3c4ebfebcac676da7992a246

PlayCred -- 0x998fb7989425ed0c14545ce27a5cc3a9d9349ac1

TimeArenaBuyRouter -- 0x3151c335224f5bbfde174b15dba9523a0694d582

Doubloon (DOUB) -- 0xc3654b4f879937b767afbb64b7c230ff436d2342

What the last sweep showed

TimeArena -- `0xba39cea0e5ef6808d8cb926c722877480049e0ee`

PodiumVaults -- `0x7abb3c243a938d1b809b07b8b3f1d60044b46698`

ReferralRegistry -- `0xc729ee049b18669e3c4ebfebcac676da7992a246`

PlayCred -- `0x998fb7989425ed0c14545ce27a5cc3a9d9349ac1`

TimeArenaBuyRouter -- `0x3151c335224f5bbfde174b15dba9523a0694d582`

Doubloon (DOUB) -- `0xc3654b4f879937b767afbb64b7c230ff436d2342`