Evaluate native-asset spending wallet protection on Terra Classic #11

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opened 2026-10-31 02:07:48 +00:00 by PlasticDigits · 0 comments

PlasticDigits commented

2026-10-31 02:07:48 +00:00

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Research follow-up from #8. CW20 controller cannot freeze Terra native LUNC/USTC, BNB or arbitrary external assets. Ethereum Safe/Argent documentation does not establish Terra deployment/support.

Acceptance:

Identify actual Terra Classic-compatible account/multisig mechanisms and reviewed code/deployment identities, or explicitly conclude unavailable; separate custody, delegation and native send coverage.
Bounded design/pilot plan for separate spending balance, independent keys/guardians, native amount limits and delayed recovery/recipient changes; include fees, automation and DEX/bridge compatibility.
Threat model module/guardian collusion, same-seed/device dependence, upgrade bypass, recovery liveness/coercion and loss of all keys. No social/identity proof alone establishes entitlement.
Provide a local/testnet-only proof if tooling is available, otherwise a documented evidence-based feasibility result and exact missing capability. No mainnet migration or real-funds experiment required for acceptance.
Publish opt-in user tradeoffs and assets explicitly uncovered. Do not advertise fleet-wide native protection or force ordinary users into KYC.

Depends on #7 inventory; deployment/adoption requires a separately scoped reviewed implementation, not this research issue.

Research follow-up from #8. CW20 controller cannot freeze Terra native LUNC/USTC, BNB or arbitrary external assets. Ethereum Safe/Argent documentation does not establish Terra deployment/support. Acceptance: - Identify actual Terra Classic-compatible account/multisig mechanisms and reviewed code/deployment identities, or explicitly conclude unavailable; separate custody, delegation and native send coverage. - Bounded design/pilot plan for separate spending balance, independent keys/guardians, native amount limits and delayed recovery/recipient changes; include fees, automation and DEX/bridge compatibility. - Threat model module/guardian collusion, same-seed/device dependence, upgrade bypass, recovery liveness/coercion and loss of all keys. No social/identity proof alone establishes entitlement. - Provide a local/testnet-only proof if tooling is available, otherwise a documented evidence-based feasibility result and exact missing capability. No mainnet migration or real-funds experiment required for acceptance. - Publish opt-in user tradeoffs and assets explicitly uncovered. Do not advertise fleet-wide native protection or force ordinary users into KYC. Depends on #7 inventory; deployment/adoption requires a separately scoped reviewed implementation, not this research issue.

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2026-10-31 02:07:48 +00:00

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2026-10-31 02:09:51 +00:00

Security upgrade: incident-driven CW20 protections and wallet security portal #3

PlasticDigits referenced this issue

2026-10-31 02:11:31 +00:00

Research: October wallet-compromise incident, rescued funds, ownership verification and further defenses #8